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Robinson et al.: Labor Law

LABOR LAW
I. LOCAL UNION
COURTS

A.

AFFAIRS

AND

THE

FEDERAL

INTRODUCTION

In Stelling v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union Number 1547, I the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the District Court of Alaska 2 in a suit filed against a
local union (Local 1547 or the Local), the International Union
(International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (lBEW)), and
various union officers. 3 The complaint by local members first
sought district court enforcement of a pJ'ovision of the union
constitution that plaintiffs claimed required a membership vote
on a new agreement negotiated by the International President.
The district court dismissed this part of the complaint on the
grounds that it had no authority to enforce union con~titutions;4
the Ninth Circuit agreed, but for somewhat different reasons. S
Second, the complaint attempted to show a breach of fiduciary
responsibility to members by various union officials. The Ninth
Circuit concurred in the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on this portion of their complaint, finding
that the duty did exist but was not breached. e The district court
also discussed the plaintiffs' failure to join the employer group,
and dismissed the injunctive prayer, finding the employer group
an indispensible party.7 The Ninth Circuit never reached this
issue, finding the merits properly disposed of in the summary
judgment portion. s
The Stelling plaintiffs asserted that jurisdiction existed
under section 30P of the Labor-Management Relations Act
1. 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. Dec., 1978) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members
were Kennedy and Tang, JJ.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2890 (1979).
2. Reported as Case v. IBEW, 438 F. Supp. 856 (D. Alaska 1977).
3. 587 F.2d at 138l.
4. 438 F. Supp. at 859.
5. 587 F.2d at 138l.
6. 1d. at 1389.
7. 438 F. Supp. at 859.
8. 587 F.2d at 1389.
9. Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) reads, in relevant part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization ... or between any such labor organiza-
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(LMRA) because a union constitution is enforceable as a "contract between labor organizations" in district court. The plaintiffs alleged that various sections of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 10 were also involved when
the various union officers misinterpreted the union constitution.
Although the LMRDA claim certainly merits extensive analysis,
it will be discussed only briefly. This Note will focus on the
Ninth Circuit's jurisdictional decision under section 301 of
LMRA.
The district court dismissed the section 301 claim because
plaintiffs grounded their complaint on provisions of the union
constitution. The district court, interpreting a previous Ninth
Circuit opinion, II deeided that section 301's grant of federal jurisdiction for labor contract violations does not also authorize suits
for breaches of union constitutions. The court of appeals agreed
with the, dismissal, but not the analysis. The appellate court
held that suit for breach of a union constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the district court when a sufficient relationship
between the constitution and labor-management relations
exists. 12 The court of appeals recently applied its Stelling decision in Studio Electrical Technicians Local 728 v. International
Photographers of the Motion Picture Industries,13 and though it
followed the "nexus analysis," requiring a significant relationship between the union constitution and labor-management relations, it appeared to also agree with a district court's statement
that union constitutions are not contracts under section 301 and
hence there can never be jurisdiction under that section. U
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
The district court ruled that this section did not authorize suits for violations of a union
constitution between labor organizations, a parent and its local. 438 F. Supp. at 858.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412, 415, 501 & 609 (1976).
11. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970).
12. 587 F.2d at 1384.
13. 598 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were
Trask, J., and Callister, D.J.).
14. The Studio circuit panel summarized the Stelling § 301 rule by stating:
We addressed this question recently in Stelling v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, ... and concluded
that, while a suit for breach of a union constitution could be
cognizable under § 301, jurisdiction is not conferred "if [the]
controversy is related only to a union dispute which will not
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Stelling accepted the Alaska District Court's analysis of the
LMRDA, with the modification that the indispensable party
analysis was superfluous. 15 In reaching this outcome, the court of
appeals adopted the district court's analysis of section 501 of the
LMRDA,16 taking the "broad" or majority view of that section. 17
The Ninth Circuit's view of a union official's fiduciary duty to
members under LMRDA section 501 is not limited to monetary
responsibilities, but extends broadly to all matters entrusted to
affect external labor relations." . . . Applying this standard,
we held jurisdiction was lacking under § 301 when local members alleged that the international and local unions violated
the union's constitution by denying them the right to vote on
the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement.
[d. at 553 (footnote and citation omitted).
The problem arises because of a statement earlier in the Studio opinion where the
court seemed to note with approval that the district court had decided: "The union constitution was not a contract and therefore that it lacked jurisdiction under LMRA §
301. ... [Wje agree with the district court's conclusion " .. " [d. at 552 n.1. Based on
the reliance on Stelling, the "district court's conclusion" with which Studio agrees is not
that the Union Constitution was not a contract, but that it was insufficiently related to
external labor relations to render it a contract under § 301.
15. 587 F.2d at 1385. The district court had separated the prayers for injunction and
declaratory relief under the LMRDA. In its analysis of the injunctive claim, it assumed
that the plaintiffs would prevail and then noted that without the joinder of the employer
group, whose contract was to be voided if the relief was granted, no adequate remedy
could be crafted. Therefore, under the FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) and Lomayatawa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975), that part of the charge must be dismissed. 438 F.
Supp. at 859-60.
16. Section 501 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives
of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to
such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore,
the duty of each such person, taking into account the special
problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization
and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same
in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain
from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in
behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his
duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal
interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization,
and to account to the organization for any profit received by
him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and
bylaws of such. . . a governing body purporting to relieve any
such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by
this section shall be void as against public policy.
17. This decision had been left undetermined in Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1275
n.2 (9th Cir. 1972).
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the care of that official. I8 However, the courts evaluating claims
of breach of those duties give great weight to the union officer's
interpretations of those obligations, if they are reasonable and
not arbitrary.19 In dealing with various other issues, the Stelling
court concluded that: 1) section 101 of the LMRDN° is activated
only during union elections and does not give union members the
right to vote on specific issues21 2) union members must exhaust
internal union procedures before bringing federal suit,22 and 3)
though attorney's fees may be appropriate for successful plaintiffs under section 101 of the LMRDA,23 the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied those expenses to these plaintiffs either because it felt them inappropriate, or because the
plaintiffs were not successful.24

B.

FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED

In 1946, the IBEW entered into a national pension plan
agreement with the National Electrical Contractors Association
(NECA) for the benefit of all IBEW members.25 The NECA, a
18. 587 F.2d at 1387.
19. Id. at 1388, quoting with approval Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).

20. Section 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976) provides:
Equal Rights - Every member of a labor organization shall
have equal rights and privileges within such organization to
nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the
labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business
of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations
in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
21. 587 F.2d at 1385.
22. Id. at 1390-91. The court relied on § 101(a)(4), 29 U .S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976)
which provides:
Protection of the right to sue - No labor organization shall
limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in
any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency
. . . {p1rovided, [tjhat any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof. . . .
23. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1976).
24. 587 F.2d at 1390. Plaintiffs also asserted jurisdiction under § 101, 29 U.S.C. §
411 (1976), and under § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 609 (1976), which prohibits discipline by the
labor organization against members who had asserted rights under LMRDA. The § 609
claim was declared moot and dismissed.
25. Actually, only the 374 U.S. locals of IBEW were covered by the International
Construction Agreement (lCA). The Canadian locals were not party to the ICA. 438 F.
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national association of employers and the IBEW International
President (the President) renegotiated that agreement, with the
President acting on the authority of a resolution of the 1976
IBEW convention. In December, 1976, the President and the
NECA entered into the International Construction Agreement
(ICA). As a part of the ICA, NECA increased its contributions to
the pension plan from $30,000,000 to $90,000,000. 26 The President
ordered all 374 affected locals to incorporate the ICA into their
local agreements. All of the locals did so, except Local 1547 (the
Local), which rejected the agreement. Upon notifying the President of the membership vote, the Local's Business Agent was directed to incorporate the ICA into the agreement with the Alaska
Chapter of NECA, which he did. The plaintiffs filed this action
in March 1977, seeking an injunction to halt the intended implementation of the ICA on July 1, 1977, pending a ratification vote
of the affected 10cals.27
Various members of the Local, including John Stelling,
wrote to the President requesting that his instructions to incorporate the ICA be rescinded on the grounds that Article IV, section 3(13) of the union constjtution28 mandated a membership
ratification vote before such agreement could be incorporated.
They were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs Darby and Hix asked officers
of the Local to sue IBEW to force the ratification vote, but they
were also unsuccessful. Darby and Hix were both disciplined but
continued to work for reforms. Both appealed the discipline
Supp. at 858.
26. Though the record doesn't indicate the bargaining posture of the President, the
district court stated "the terms admittedly and obviously involved some concession by
the mEW." [d.
27. 587 F.2d at 1382.
28. There are actually two critical sections of the mEW Constitution, Art. IV, §§
3(12) and 3(13). Plaintiffs alleged that § 3(13) required a ratification vote on the ICA;
defendants asserted that § 3(13) was reached only if § 3(12) didn't apply, which they
asserted did so. The sections state:
3(12) The International President is empowered as follows:
To enter into . . . agreements with any . . . association of employers . . . to cover the entire jurisdiction
of the mEW.
3(13) The International President ... shall not enter into
agreements affecting wages, hours and conditions of
employment where local union agreement, covering
such employment, already exists, without first notifying at least thirty (30) days in advance of such agreements, the local unions so concerned or affected, in a
district, and then only by procuring consent of a majority of the local unions in the district or the individual
local unions affected by this agreement.
587 F .2d at 13f'- nn
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through intra-union procedures and in August, 1977, the IBEW
dismissed all charges against them. 29
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Alaska District Court on March
28, 1977, asking the court to enforce Article IV, section 3(13) of
the IBEW Constitution; the plaintiffs specifically refused to
attack the ICA directl y30 and asserted that section 301 of the
LMRA gave the district court jurisdiction to enforce the constitution. The district court determined that under Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Svacek,31 section 301 will not support a
cause of action where a union member sues for breach of the
union constitution, even if the constitutional rights are related to
a collective bargaining agreement. 32 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that in certain instances a union constitution will
support a section 301 suit when the issues raised have "traumatic industrial and economic repercussions, . . . or significantly affected labor-management relations."33 Since in Stelling,
plaintiffs refused to attack the ICA directly, the court of appeals
ruled that there was an insufficient nexus between the labormanagement relations and the constitutional dispute to warrant
taking jurisdiction. 34 It is significant to note, however, that plaintiffs got their day in court, for the merits of the LMRDA section
501 claim were heard. The plaintiff's position, however, did not
withstand a summary judgment motion. 35 The significance of the
fact that plaintiffs did not lack a forum under Stelling on the
section 301 suit will be discussed below. 3ft
C.

SECTION 301 OF THE LMRA

Section 301 of the LMRA was adopted by the Taft-Hartley
Congress of 1947 to eliminate certain technical obstacles to suits
29. This factual pattern is distilled in 587 F.2d at 1381-82 and 438 F. Supp. at 858.
30. As to why the plaintiffs refused to atack the lCA directly, thereby placing their
constitutional claim in a self-imposed isolation, the record is silent. Several reasons suggest themselves. Perhaps plaintifs were attempting to avoid the necessary party analysis
(see note 15 supra), or perhaps they were attempting to have a union constitution held to
be a "contract" under § 301 in its own right.
31. 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. 438 F. Supp. at 859.
33. 587 F.2d at 1383, quoting Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 916 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
34. 587 F.2d at 1384.
35. [d. at 1389.
36. See notes and accompanying text.
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in federal court for breach of a collective bargaining agreementY
It states:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties. 38

The obstacles to federal jurisdiction that Congress attempted to
correct arose partially from the common law requirement that
before a union could be sued, all of the members of the union
had to be joined in the action. Another contributing factor was
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193239 that had apparently deprived
federal courts of jurisdiction over conflicts arising in the labormanagement area. One of the major problems with section 301
(besides the dearth of legislative history) was that Congress
neglected to repeal the contradictory sections of other federal labor laws (for example, Norris-LaGuardia) or to explain the relative functions of each in light of these contradictions. 40
37. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: ll., 59 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1959). See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1034-40 (1963), and
Epstein, The Expanding Coverage of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 26 LAB. L.J. 439 (1975).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
40. A profitable comparison can be made between § 301 and the following sections of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no
court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of the
Act; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
No offic~ or member of any association or organization, and
no association or organization participating or interested in a
labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of
the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers,
members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
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The history of section 301 is replete with problems of judicial interpretation, with the major interpretive difficulties arising
from the language of the statute. For example, what items are
included in the term "contracts"? How is the term "labor organization" to be interpreted? Who is bound by the contract, the
parties negotiating it or the employees it was negotiated for, or
both? Who has standing to bring a section 301 suit? Once the
jurisdictional criteria are established, preemption and conflict of
law problems also arise: 1) what law is to be used to interpret
the contracts? 2) what is the effect of overlapping or contradictory provisions of other labor laws?, and 3) what is the role of the
National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) and the state courts,
who apparently have parallel jurisdiction of many of the same
issues?41 While the Stelling court never got past the first four
jurisdiction questions, the preemption and conflicts areas are
both fascinating and largely unresolved. 42 They are, however,
beyond the scope of this Note, which will focus on the jurisdictional problem presented to the Stelling panel.
The Stelling court dealt primarily with the jurisdictional
questions of what constitutes a "contract" and who can sue
whom under it, and determined that a union constitution is a
section 301 contract when it is sufficiently related to external
labor-management relations.43 A sufficient relationship exists
when the controversy arising under the constitution has a clear
nexus to labor-management relations and is not confined to internal union affairs'" In establishing the necessity of a "nexus"
test to determine jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit created procedural rules for the federal district courts of the Ninth Circuit.
This power to establish a common law for the federal courts is
drawn from an analysis of policy considerations implicit in the
federal labor laws and the state court case law on internal union
affairs. Exercise of this power will profoundly impact on which
disputes shall be substantively analyzed in the Ninth Circuit. To
facilitate an understanding of this impact, first the judicial history of section 301 will be discussed. Then, the influences that

•

29 U.S.C. § 105 (1976). For text of § 301(a), see text accompanying note 38 supra, and for
§ 301(b), see note 49 infra.
41. See Meltzer, supra note 37, at 270 for a slightly different formulation of the interpretive difficulties of § 30l.
42. [d. at 276-8l.
43. 587 F.2d at 1383.
44. [d. at 1384.
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culminated in the Stelling decision will be noted. Though a
major part of section 301 case law has dealt with judicial enforcement of arbitration provisions and no-strike clauses, that body of
law is only marginally relevant. 45
Judicial History of Section 301

The first time the Supreme Court faced an issue arIsmg
under the provisions of section 301, it was unable to reach a consensus. In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees u.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,48 the Court reviewed an Illinois
decision holding that section 301 would not support a suit by a
union on behalf of its members for wages believed due the
employees under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Three justices 47 strongly implied that section 301 was unconstitutional for it gave federal courts the right to apply state law and
therefore conflicted with the provisions of Article III of the
United States Constitution. 48 However, by determining that the
union had no standing to bring a suit for uniquely personal
rights of employees, (thereby ignoring the express language of
section 301(b)49) the three justices dismissed the claim without
reaching the constitutional issues. 5o Another three justices51 con45. Duhau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 432 (1969);
Rains, Boys Market Injunctions: Strict Scrutiny of the Presumption of Arbitrability, 28
LAB. L.J. 30 (1977); Note, Some Problems Relating to Judicial Protection of the Right to
Have Arbitration Agreements Enforced Under Subsection 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
59 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1959); Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-Strike Clauses,
39 IND. L.J. 387 (1964). See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, Ch. 17
(1971 & Cumm. Supp. 1971-75 & Supp. 1976, 1977, 1978).
46. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
47. Id. at 439. (Frankfurther, Burton and Harlan, JJ.).
48. Id. at 449-59. Article Ill, § 2 of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction
to the federal courts. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
49. Section 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) states:
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter and
any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in
this Chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the
United -States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its
assets, an~ shall not be enforceable against any individual
member or his assets.
50. 348 U.S. at 453.
51. Id. at 461 (Warren, Clark and Reed, JJ.).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

9

368

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 13

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:359

curred on the dismissal, but not on the constitutional dicta. 52
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, arguing that
the union had standing to sue, and that section 301 was more
than merely a jurisdictional grant to apply state law. Justice
Douglas argued that Congress had intended to grant authority to
the federal courts to develop federal rules to interpret collective
bargaining agreements. 53
The Douglas-Black position ultimately 'prevailed, when in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,54 Justice Douglas, writing for a majority, stated that section 301 is more than jurisdictional: "[Section 301] expresses a federal policy that federal
courts enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor
organizations and that industrial peace can best be established
only in that way. "55
Lincoln Mills arose in the context of a union suit against an

employer for specific performance of an arbitration clause in
their collective bargaining agreement. The union had filed a
grievance. The employer refused to submit to final and binding
arbitration as the contract arbitration clause required. Justice
Douglas noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred federal
courts from granting equitable relief such as specific enforcement, but he found the Norris-LaGuardia provisions inapplicable because they were not directed toward the abuses raised in
Lincoln Mills.58 This creative reading of the statutory language
was apparently not palatable to Justices Burton and Harlan who
preferred the logic of the Court's inherent equitable jurisdiction
"nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce labor arbitration in industries affecting commerce."57 Justice
Frankfurter filed a strong dissent, questioning the authority of
federal courts to create a body of federal common law, whether
accomplished through an inherent equitable power of the courts
or through legislative fiat.58 The question of where the federal
law is to be derived from is left decidedly unclear by Lincoln
52. [d. at 465.
53. [d.

54. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
55. [d. at 455.
56. [d. at 458-59. Assuming that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed at a particular goal (see note 40 supra) by attaching stringent conditions on § 301 jurisdiction, the

Stelling court is probably reflecting the remnants of that influence.
57. [d. at 460 (Burton, J., concurring).
58. [d. at 480-81 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Mills,59 and the Stelling court's decision is but the latest in a
long series of cautious judicial footsteps in the molding of the
new law.

Justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court, emphasized many of the unresolved areas of the Lincoln Mills decision.
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of
Carpenters, 80 he stated that the recent Lincoln Mills decision did
not remove from the purview of state courts, all disputes that
concern issues arguably covered by the language of section 301.
He noted that the new "federal common law" had no substance
as yet and questioned the impact of this amorphous area on
state court determinations in deciding claims grounded in collective bargaining areas.81 As one commentator pointed out, Justice
Traynor was probably unduly concerned, as this federal common
law would probably be developed from the state courts' case law:
[E]xcept for a narrow range of issues, neither the
LMRA nor other national labor laws supply a
meaningful guide for the development of a new
body of jurisprudence to govern the enforcement
of collective agreements. It thus seems likely that
the new federal law will be distilled largely from
state court doctrines, which in turn are derived
largely from commercial law analogies reshaped to
some extent to reflect the distinctive elements of
the collective bargaining relationship.B2
59. About the only question clearly resolved in Lincoln Mills, was the constitutional
one. Justice Douglas stated that every complaint grounded in § 301 stated a federal ques·
tion under Art. m of the Federal Constitution:
There is no constitutional difficulty. Article m, § 2, extends
the judicial power to cases "arising under ... the Laws of the
United States . . . . " The power of Congress to regulate these
labor· management controversies under the Commerce Clause
is plain . . . . A case or controversy arising under § 301(a) is,
therefore, one within the purview of judicial power as defined
in Article m.
[d. at 457 (citations omitted). See also Meltzer, supra note 37, at 274.
60. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Justice
Traynor virtually predicted the outcome in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959), which established that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to [29
U.S.C. §§ 157 or 158 (1976)] of the [LMRA], the States as well as the federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245. The ramifica·
tions of federal presumption are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally C. MORRIS,
supra note 45, at Ch. 32.
61. 49 Cal. 2d at 57·64, 315 P.2d at 328·33.
62. Meltzer, supra note 37, at 278.
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The year following Lincoln Mills was productive insofar as
judicial construction of section 301 was concerned. Two district
courts extended section 301's language to include a union's constitution within the definition of "contract,"63 sparking some desperate pleas to limit 301 disputes between international unions. 64
The Supreme Court decided that the district courts could look to
state law to interpret collective bargaining agreements provided
such state law was not inconsistent with the federal labor law
policies. 65 The Seventh Circuit grappled with some of the difficulties of section 301 in United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union. 66 The Textile Workers Union (TWU) filed for an election in a unit represented by the United Textile Workers (UTW)
and UTW complain.ed to the AFL-CIO, the parent body of both
the international unions. Under the AFL-CIO no-raiding agreements, an impartial umpire heard the issue and decided in favor
of UTW and ordered TWU to withdraw its request with the
NLRB for an electionY When TWU refused, UTW brought a 301
suit to enforce the umpire's decision. Meanwhile, the NLRB ordered an election. A district court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) against the NLRB,68 and the dispute proceeded to
the court of appeals. The Seventh Circuit issued an interim order dissolving the TRO and reviewed the dispute, de novo, refusing both to be bound by the umpire's decision and to allow
NLRB participation in the process. GD The court eventually agreed
with the umpire and TWU withdrew its election request. The
NLRB allowed TWU to withdraw its request, but stated that it
did not agree with the court's presumption of jurisdiction. 70 The
Second Circuit had decided that 301 not only covered written
"contracts" but if past practices and policies were definite
enough, they would assume jurisdiction to enforce them under
section 301; the court then affirmed that decision in 1961. 71
63. Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 F. Supp. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Carpenter's Local 2608 v. Millmen's Local 1495, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1958). See also Epstein, supra note 37, at 444-45.
64. Note, Applying the "Contracts Between Labor Organizations" Clause of TaftHartley Section 301: A Plea for Restraint} 69 YALE L.J. 299 (1959).
65. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
66. 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958). See Epstein, supra note 37, at 440; Meltzer, supra
note 37, at 296-97.
67. UTW v. TWUA, 30 Lab. Arb. 244 (1958) (Cole, Arb.).
68. UTW v. TWUA, 42 L.R.R.M. 2066 (N,D, IlL 1958).
69, Meltzer, supra note 37, at 296-97.
70. [d. at 297; Personal Prod. Corp., 122 N .L.R.B. 563 (1958).
71. Hamilton Foundry & Mfg. Co, v. Moulders & Foundry Workers, 193 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (oral collective bargaining agreement enforced
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The Supreme Court' entered the fray again in 1962, issuing
three major decisions, Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining CO.,72 Retail
Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods,73 and Smith v. Evening News. 74 Atkinson decided that "labor organization" was to be interpreted similarly to section 152(5)15 of the LMRA (thereby resurrecting the
NLRB's expertise in labor relations). Lion Dry Goods upheld the
expansive reading of "contracts" to include no-raiding agreements between international unions. Evening News continued
the expansion of 301, by specifically overruling Westinghouse
and by holding that unions have standing to bring suit to enforce
"uniquely personal rights" of the employees it represents. 78 The
Court's intent in overruling Westinghouse was to give a broad
reading to section 30l. 77
By 1962, section 301 had assumed an imposing stature in
the interpretation of disputes in all aspects of labor-management
relations and labor relations in general. "Contracts" included
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers
and these agreements could be enforced on behalf of individual
employees and/or their unions. 78 "Contracts" also included noraiding agreements between international unions. 7U The Court
had not spoken directly on whether "contracts" extended to such
things as union constitutions, though there were strong hints
that as long as the decision was not inconsistent with federal
labor policies, the federal courts could enforce provisions of union
constitutions and charters through state law rules. 80 Neverthewithout mentioning § 301); accord, Hod Carriers Local 33 v. Mason Tenders, 291 F.2d
496 (2d Cir. 1961).
72. 370 U.S. 238 (1962), rev'd in part, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970) (Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar injunctive relief for breach of nostrike clause in collective bargaining agreements).
73. 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
74. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
75. The NLRB has broadly interpreted this section to include trustees of a pension
plan, NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
974 (1968), or a group of unorganized workers protesting wages, NLRB v. Kennametal,
Inc., 183 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950). This part of the Atkinson decision goes a long way
towards expanding the scope of § 301. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 442; Carpenters
Local 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1974).
76. 371 U.S. at 199.
77. "Section 301 is not to be given a narrow ruling." [d.
78. Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
79. Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
SO. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), where the
Supreme Court affirmed a state court determination that a union constitution was a contract under which wrongfully expelled members of a union could sue for reinstatement.
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less, except in the area of arbitration,81 the Supreme Court has
bowed out of the area covered by section 301,82 thus allowing the
circuits to grapple, relatively unaided, with the parameters of
the federal law fashioned to cover contracts in the labor area.
Since Evening News, the circuits have primarily dealt with
who may sue under section 301 and what constitutes "contracts"
covered by that section. Both of these concerns were apparent in
the Stelling decision and have formed a large area.in the developing federal common law of labor relations. The preemption
areas, insofar as the problems of choice of law and forum, are
potentially explosive. 83 In interpreting conduct that arguably
transgresses both the area of sections 301 of the LMRA, and provisions administered by the NLRB, there are three forums available: the state courts, the NLRB and the district courts. The
state courts are preempted if the dispute is arguably an unfair
labor practice and subject to the exclusive concern of the NLRB.
But if a collective bargaining agreement or union constitution is
disputed, there are strong ~rguments for the state courts to'
assert jurisdiction, if only to create principles for the federal
common law to incorporate. 84 The NLRB is likely to defer to
any grievance provisions in the contract83 and if deference is
accorded, the district courts are likely to become the appropriate
forum for litigation of contract disputes.
Proper Parties under Section 301

The Stelling court's statement that "jurisdiction [under section 301] depends on the nature of the action rather than the
status of the parties"86 represents the broad consensus of the circuits87 that virtually anyone can bring suit under section 301 as
long as the controversy involves a contract between labor organizations. The days of the Westinghouse decision when "uniquely
81. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
82. Stelling v. Local 1547, mEW, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 2890 (1979); Local 657, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Parks v. mEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
83. See text accompanying notes 40 to 41 supra.
84. See notes 60 to 62 supra and accompanying text.
85. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
86. 587 F.2d at 1383, citing Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976).
87. [d.
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personal rights" of employees were not enforceable by the unions
representing those employees are long gone. In Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight,88 one of the few Supreme Court signposts since
1962, this point was specifically emphasized. The trend has extended so far as to allow a suit against individual employees for
personal breaches of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated on their behalf.89
The consensus of the circuits is also indicated by the uniform interpretation of "labor organization," to include sister
locals involved in inter-union disputes. This reading of labor organizations is drawn from LMRA, section 152(5)90 as defined by
the NLRB.91
"Contracts" Covered by Section 301

After deciding, in Lion Dry Goods, that "contracts" includes
more than collective bargaining agreements,92 the Supreme
Court established in Smith v. Evening News that "[s]ection 301
is not to be given a narrow reading. "93 Prior to Stelling, there
were two major lines of analyses in interpreting what "contracts"
were subject to section 301; one line was represented by the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Parks v. IBEW;94 the other was represented by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hotel & Restaurant
Employees v. Svacek. 95
The Fourth Circuit, in a well reasoned opinion, decided that
contracts include union constitutions. After noting that the
Supreme Court had not addressed the question, the Parks court
looked to legislative history for guidance. They decided that, at
best, Congress had not foreseen the question. 98 The Parks court
concluded that "[i]t is also possible, however, to conclude that
Congress would have deemed it appropriate for federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over such disputes because, as the present
88.
(1971).
89.
1978).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

424 U.S. 555 (1976). See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
369 U.S. at 25-28.
371 U.S. at 199.
314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970).
314 F.2d at 916.
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one, they have traumatic industrial and economic repercussions. ''17 In accepting jurisdiction, the Parks court did not require a showing of traumatic industrial and economic consequences. Congress, they said, could have considered disputes
arising around union constitutions to be of serious consequence
to labor-management relations. u8 The Parks court determined
that the preemption doctrine was inappropriate to section 301
disputes. vI In rapid succession, the First,IOO Second lol and Seventh Circuits l02 followed the Parks court lead.
The other major theory had been announced in the Ninth
Circuit's Svacek decision. In that decision, the union had sued
under section 301 to collect a fine levied against one of their
members for crossing a picket line. In a per curiam decision, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. The
Svacek court stated the general federal policy that internal
union affairs were not subject to district court interference; however, they also issued a blanket statement that section 301 does
not confer jurisdiction over internal disputes of unions. lo3 The
Tenth lO4 and the Third Circuits l05 agreed with the Ninth, and
those courts that attempted to reconcile Parks with Svacek and
Smith v. United Mine Workers lO8 declined to follow Svacek insofar as the blanket "internal union affairs" language. lol One commentator attempted to reconcile the decisions and concluded:
97. [d. (emphasis added).
98. [d. at 915.
99. [d. at 914.
100. Carpenters Local 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st
Cir. 1974).
101. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1009 (1971). Though the Abrams court reluctantly accepted jurisdiction, it left open the
question of whether a union charter, standing alone, is a § 301 contract. Accord, Santos
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 547 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit
resolved any questions left open by Abrams by accepting jurisdiction over a union consti.
tution in a § 301 context.
102. Local 657, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1256
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977).
103. 431 F.2d at 706.
104. Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974). But ct. Adams v. International
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1959) (in a non-301 context, the Tenth
Circuit stated that a union constitution was a contract).
105. Antal v. Budzanoski, 320 F. Supp. 161 (W.O. Pa. 1970), modified sub nom.,
Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972). It is
important to note that in this fact pattern, plaintiffs also received their day in court
through the LMROA claims. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 450.
106. 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974).
107. Keck v. Employees Independent Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 241 (E.O. Pa. 1974).
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While [Svacek and Smith v. United Mine
Workers] seem to be directly in conflict with
[Parks]' it may be possible to at least partially
recondle them by taking a closer look into the nature of the disputes involved and the role played
by the judicial policy against interference in internal union affairs. lOS

In Svacek and Smith, the dispute could be characterized as
purely internal to the workings of the unions involved and lacking the traumatic industrial and economic repercussions of
Parks. The commentator continued:
While this distinction between purely internal disputes and those intraunion disputes which have
an effect on labor-management relations goes
some distance toward reconciling these cases,
there still remains a tension. This is due to the
fact that the courts in both Svacek and Smith v.
United Mine Workers of America make blanket
statements to the effect that section 301 does not
confer jurisdiction over intra-union disputes. 101

Clearly, it was this tension that led the District Court of
Alaska, when confronted with the Stelling fact pattern, to conclude that it had no jurisdiction. The Stelling appellate court
decided that the district court would have had jurisdiction if
the plaintiffs had alleged facts that demonstrated some nexus
to labor-management relations, such as directly attacking the International Construction Agreement. llo However, since the plaintiffs were unable to do so, the court decided that the federal
common law of section 301 mandated that union constitutions
could only be considered section 301 contracts if the underlying
dispute was substantially related to labor-management relations,
and hence the dismissal was affirmed. 111 Although the bland
assertion that this is consistent with Svacek is farfetched,1I2
the partial reconciliation with the Parks position is heartening
to those seeking predictability in the area. 1I3
108. Epstein, supra note 37, at 445.
109. [d. at 446 (emphasis added).
110. 587 F.2d at 1384.
111. [d.
112. [d. at 1383.
113. See 1199 DC, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. National
Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for an earlier
indication of the course the Stelling court is attempting to chart.
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The Status of Section 301 Suits after Stelling

The tension between the Parks and Smith courts is narrowed by the Stelling decision. The First and Second Circuits
seem the most receptive to accepting 301 suits over disputes
marginally related to labor management relations,,'4 The Tenth
and Third Circuits' positions represent the strictest stances on
disputes that can be characterized as internal union affairs, and
perhaps the most consistent with the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 1I5 Now, the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit are steering a middle course, accepting jurisdiction,1I8 but demanding more than conclusary allegations of
substantial labor-management relations impact. 1I7 Until the
Supreme Court clarifies the area, the federal common law of
labor-management relations will be fashioned with a great deal
of local variance.
D. THE IMPACT

OF

THE LMRDA

ON

THE 301 ISSUES

In Stelling, it is critical to note that the court, in denying
jurisdiction under section 301 did reach the issue on the merits
as presented under the LMRDA.lIs Plaintiffs asserted in the 301
context that the Union Constitution mandated a ratification vote
on the ICA, and in the LMRDA context that certain union officials had breached their fiduciary duty to the membership by
denying that vote. Although plaintiffs were unsuccessful in
pressing their claims, the court, through the process of expansive
reading of section 501 of the LMRDA, was able to relegate section 301 of the LMRA to areas not involving intra-union
matters. III
The Scope of Section 501 of the LMRDA

Other circuits have split on the issue of whether a union
officer's fiduciary obligations under section 501 of the LMRDA
114. See Local Union 1219, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1974); New York State United Teachers v.
Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. See cases cited at notes 104 and 105 supra.
116. While neither circuit has actually accepted jurisdiction yet, they threaten to do
so. See cases cited at notes 95 and 113 supra and accompanying text.
·117. 587 F.2d at 1384.
118. "The allegation that appellees have denied the membership of the union the
constitutionally guaranteed right to vote is a sufficient assertion of a breach of trust on
the part of t h e appelleesitllYoke the jurisdiction of § 501." [d. at 1387.
119. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 449-50.
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encompasses more than monetary obligations. The district court
in Stelling, after analyzing the majority120 and minority121 positions, noted that the Ninth Circuit had expressly left the question open. 122 The lower court then opted for the majority view
that a union official's fiduciary duty to members should be
broadly construed and the Ninth Circuit approved. The Second
Circuit remains the only adherent of the minority view that
fiduciary duty is to be confined to monetary matters.123 The narrow, or minority view of section 501 is basically indefensible, insofar as it derives from legislative history.
This narrow view of the fiduciary obligations of union officials imposed by section 501 was first espoused in Gurton v.
Arons. 124 The Gurton court was called upon to interpret a union's
constitution and bylaws to assess the depth of the obligations
imposed on the officers of the union. To aid in the interpretation,
the court looked to the union's own interpretation of the constitution. Finding that interpretation not unreasonable or arbitrary, the court found no breach of the fiduciary obligation. The
Classic rationale of the LMRDA then appeared in the opinion:
120. The Eighth Circuit first announced the majority position in Johnson v. Nelson,
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). Accord, Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Cefalo v. Moffet, 449 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McCabe v.
Local 1377, mEW, 415 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1969); Parks v. mEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md.
1962), aff'd, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
121. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1971). Accord, Head v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1975); Vanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967).
122. Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972). Kerr states that the question had
been left undecided, but see Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Union Officers Under Section
501 of the LMRDA, 37 LA. L. REV. 875 (1977) for a strong argument that the Kerr court
had, by the circuitous route of attaching monetary obligations to every duty of union
officials, already adopted the majority position.
123. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1971).
124. [d. In Gurton, the Second Circuit stated:
It is clear . . . that Section 501 of the L.M.R.D.A. has no application to the present controversy. A simple reading of the
section shows that it applies to fiduciary responsibility with
respect to the money and property of the union and that it is
not a catch-all provision under which union officials can be
sued on any ground of misconduct with which the plaintiffs
. choose to charge them. If further corroboration for this position
be needed it will be found in the legislative history and in the
law review articles cited by Judge Tenney in his opinion in the
district court.
[d. at 375 (footnote omitted).
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The provisions of the L.M.R.D.A. were not intended by Congress to constitute an invitation to
the courts to intervene at will in the internal affairs of unions. Courts have no special expertise in
the operation of unions which would justify a
broad power to interfere. The internal operations
of unions are to be left to the officials chosen by
the members to manage those operations except
in the very limited instances expressly provided
by the Act. The conviction of some judges that
they are better able to administer a union's affairs
than the elected officials is wholly without foundation. Most unions are honestly and efficiently
administered and are much more likely to continue to be so if they are free from officious intermeddling by the courts. General supervision of
unions by the courts would not contribute to the
betterment of the unions or their members or to
the cause of labor-management relations. 125

The Stelling court's fiduciary analysis of the underlying dispute may be subject to some criticism, because it adopts a per se
approach: if the union's interpretation is reasonable, then there
is no breach. 128 A more defensible position would examine the
underlying dispute. l27 While criticism is well grounded in theory,
125. 1d. However, the Gurton court went on to base its reading of § 501 on legislative
history.Id. at 376. See Kratzke, Fidiciary Obligations in the Internal Political Affairs of
Labor Unions Under Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1019 (1977). Professor Kratzke pointed out that the
Gurton court arrived at their legislative history analysis by relying on Judge Tenney's
analysis below:
Judge Tenney's reading of the legislative history is open to
some criticism. In Judge Tenney's discussion of the legislative
history of section 501(a), he comments that:
The legislative history of the Section would appear to
also be in accord with defendants' position that the Section relates solely to questions of financial dealings.
Thus, during the course of debate, Senators McClellan
and Ervin made it quite clear that the Section would
relate solely to matters of money and property. See II
Leg. History 1129-31 (1959).
Unfortunately, the debate to which Judge Tenney refers concerned the Senate version of the bill . . . which was never
passed.
1d. at 1026 n.37 (citations omitted). See also Comment, supra note 122, at 875; Beaird,
Union Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 2 GA. L. REV. 469, 518 (1968).
126. 587 F.2d at 1388-89 .•
127. According to Professor Kratzke, the proper fiduciary analysis in Stelling would
be to examine the union officers constitutional basis for his or her actions, and then, if
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had the Stelling court adopted a standard fiduciary analysis, the
probable outcome would have been identical,l28 and the actual
approach, deferring to the unions' own interpretation, recognizes
the political autonomy of the labor organization. 129
Title I of the LMRDA

The plaintiffs in Stelling asserted that defendants violated
section 101(a)(I)130 when they denied the membership a ratification vote. Jurisdiction is granted district courts over section 101
disputes by section 102.131 The court held that, "although the
LMRDA guarantees members the right to vote in union elections, it does not guarantee them the right to vote on a particular question. "132
The Stelling decision, relying on Calhoon v. Harvey,l33 and
that is weak, to look to the underlying dispute to discover what would be in the best
interest of the union members as a whole.
When a court does choose to intervene in the affairs of a labor
organization, it must be prepared to make a determination of
the interests of the union as a group, since without such a determination the court is unable to examine the nature of the
fiduciary obligation of union officials under section 501(a).
Moreover, if the fiduciary obligation is defined in this manner,
it becomes at least conceivable that the best interests of the
labor organization and its members might not be those expressed in a vote taken at any particular meeting. Hence the
conclusion is compelling that even an apparent infringement
on the voting rights of union members should not be conclusive proof that fiduciary obligations to the labor organization
guaranteed under section 501(a) have been breached.
Yet even in circuits adopting the broad view of fiduciary responsibilities under section 501(a), the courts have exhibited a
propensity toward per se analysis. Such per se analysis is not
suitable when the interest of the labor organization is properly
considered.
Kratzke, supra note 125, at 1032 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Applying this
formula, the district court noted the Stelling fact pattern was subject to a weak constitutional justification. 438 F. Supp. at 861-62. Therefore, according to Professor Kratzke, the
lower court should have examined the underlying dispute. Nevertheless, even had it done
80, with 373 out of 374 affected locals approving the pact, it would have been difficult if
not impossible for the Stelling plaintiffs to show that a ratification vote would be in their
best interest.
128. 1d.

129. 587 F.2d at 1389.
130. For the text of § 101(a)(1), see note 20 supra.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976); 587 F.2d at 1385.
132. 1d.

133. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
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its progeny,134 reiterates the well-settled rule that section
lO1(a)(l) is not violated unless plaintiffs were treated disparately. Here the plaintiffs could allege no discrimination because
all IBEW locals had been denied the ratification vote by the
President's interpretation of the union's constitution. Thus, the
members' only forum is the IBEW internal procedures of
appeal. 135
Plaintiffs also alleged that the various union officers failed to
inform the membership of the provisions of Title I of the
LMRDA, the bill of rights for union members.136 However, section 101(a)(4) suggested an exhaustion of remedies requirement
which the Stelling court adopted. 137 Since plaintiffs had never exhausted any internal union remedies, but merely filed suit, the
court dismissed the complaint. 138
The district court also denied attorneys' fees for plaintiffs.
The exact theory for upholding the denial was not clear, however. The district court, citing Hall u. Cole,139 stated that there
was no evidence to support such an award. 140 In Hall, the
Supreme Court ruled that when a plaintiff prevails under section
102, a court may award attorney's fees. 141 The Ninth Circuit
stated that the lower court considered attorney's fees, and denied them. What appears to have happened is that the district
court considered that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties in the
sense of Hall u. Cole. When the Ninth Circuit affirmed, it chose
to view the district court's action as within that court's discretion and not an application of case law.142

E.

CONCLUSION

In Stelling, the Ninth Circuit announced that internal union
affairs are subject to judicial supervision through section 301 of
134. Lux v. Blackmun, 546 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976); Fritsch v. District Council No.
9, 493 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1974; Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974).
135. For a summary of the IBEW internal structure, see Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d
886, 916 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
136. Section 105 of the LMRDA provides: "Every labor organization shall inform its
members concerning the provisions of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 415 (1976).
137. See note 22 supra.
138. 587 F.2d at 1391.
139. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
140. "As to the issue of attorney's fees there has been no evidence to support such an
award under the rationale of Hall u. Cole . ... " 438 F. Supp. at 862 (citation omitted).
141. 412 U.S. at 9.
142. 587 F.2d at 1390, distinguishing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d
1267 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
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the LMRA only when the underlying dispute is sufficiently related to labor-management relations. u3 Conclusory allegations
of a nexus to labor-management relations will not be sufficient to
state a cause of action; facts calling into question some agreement between labor and management will have to be alleged.
The source of the procedural and substantive rule is the federal
common law crafted by the Ninth Circuit under the rule of Lincoln Mills and the policies of various federal labor laws.
The Stelling court also adopted a broad interpretation of
section 501 of the LMRDA, holding that a union officer's fiduciary.duty to union members extends beyond monetary matters, to
a spectrum of duties and responsibilities placed in the care of
that officer. However, in interpreting the scope of those duties to
determine if a breach has occurred, the Ninth Circuit will look to
the union hierarchy's interpretation of the scope of their duties.
If their interpretation is reasonable and not arbitrary, then the
court will defer to it.
By this juxtaposition of the LMRA and LMRDA in Stelling,
the theory of judicial interference in internal union affaris in the
Ninth Circuit is elucidated. If the plaintiffs object to internal decisions by their officers and union and they are prepared to challenge the agreement reached with management through those internal procedures, the Ninth Circuit will accept jurisdiction
under either the agreement or the union constitution. If plaintiffs
143. By tying § 301 to a sufficient nexus between the beneficiaries of the Stelling
pension fund, the employees and the signatories of the agreement (the unions and employers), the Ninth Circuit may be forestalling judicial intervention into internal union
affairs but the delay should only be considered temporary. The applications of the Stelling decision in non-pension fund situations, such as in Studio Electrical Technicians
Local 728 v. International Photographers of the Motion Pictures Industries, 598 F.2d 557
(9th Cir. 1979), relegates locals to their own internal proceedings of appeal. Individual
employees attacking the use of pension fund dollars for political purposes are going to
assert rights that need a forum. The close ties of § 301 to § 501 of LMRDA, as represented in Stelling, is perhaps a harbinger of things to come, confining employees to
LMRDA rather than LMRA in assessing pension fund obligations. See Raskin, Pension
Funds Could Be The Union's Secret Weapon, Fortune, Dec. 31, 1979, at 17. Mr. Raskin
prophetizes that unions will take over investment of their huge pension funds from conservative investment committees and invest only in labor sympathetic businesses. Since
pension fund committees are "labor organizations," NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381
F.2d 61 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1968), and this step would relate these
agreements to labor-management relations, a strong argument is available to union members wishing to question this proposed practice under § 301 of LMRA.
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are primarily concerned about the internal machinations that led
to the agreement, they are relegated to internal appeal and
claims under the LMRDA.
Kevin G. Robinson

III.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST TRUSTEESHIPS: BENDA V. GRAND LODGE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Benda v. Grand Lodge of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Benda),1 the Ninth Circuit
reviewed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction2 enjoining a trusteeship imposed by an international union on its
local union under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or the Act).3 Benda joins a long line of cases
1. 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978) (per Sneed, J., the other panel members were
Trask, J. and Skopil, D.J.), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2065 (1979).
2. 442 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (per Schwartzer, D.J.).
3. Landrum Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461·466 (1976). For general background and
discussion of the trusteeship provisions of the LMRDA, see Beaird, Union Trusteeship
Provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 2 GA. L. REv.
469 (1968); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 845·51 (1960); Note, The Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act: A Review of Judicial Developments, 42 U.
Cm. L. REv. 77 (1973); Note, Landrum Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 YALE L.
J. 1460 (1~62);
Section 462 of the Act provides several proper purposes for trusteeships:
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor
organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with
the constitution and bylaws of the organization which has as·
sumed trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purose
of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the
performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties
of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic proce·
dures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such
labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
Section 464 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Upon the written complaint of any member or subordinate
body of a labor organization alleging that such organization has
violated the provisions of this subchapter . . . the Secretary
shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary finds prob·
able cause to believe that such violation has occurred and has
not been remedied he shall, without disclosing the identity of
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that have addressed the issue of whether a trusteeship has been
imposed for a proper purpose under the Act} What sets Benda
apart from these cases is the standard of review used by the Ninth
Circuit and the manner in which the court applied its standard.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court grant of injunctive
relief, asserting that the key element to be considered in granting
such relief is the relative hardship to the parties. The Benda court
utilized a balancing test which provides that as the balance of
harm tips toward the moving party, that party's burden of showing likely success on the merits lessens. 5 While the result in Benda
is arguably justifiable, the court failed to clearly explicate its
rationale and paid little, if any, attention to the statutory presumption of validity accorded trusteeships by the LMRDA.8
The importance of the issue of trusteeships is illustrated by
the statutory framework created by Congress. In 1959, Congress
enacted the LMRDA for the purpose of regulating internal union
affairs in order to promote union democracy. 7 To achieve this
the complainant, bring a civil action in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for
such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any
member or subordinate body of a labor organization affected by
any violation. . . may bring a civil action in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
(c) In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship
established by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be provided in
accordance with its constitution or bylaws shall be presumed
valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period
except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was
not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under section 462 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 464 (1976) (emphasis added).
4. Proper purposes are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 462 (l976); for the relevant language
of § 462, see note 3 supra. For case law interpreting the section see, e.g., Gordon v.
Laborers In1'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (lOth Cir. 1973); Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); McVicker v. International
Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
5. 584 F.2d at 314-15.
6. The provision for a statutory presumption of validity is contained in 29 U.S.C. §
464(c) (1976). For text of the statute, see note 3 supra.
7. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
6 (1976).
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purpose, the Act provides for various civil and criminal enforcement proceedings and for systematic disclosure via reporting. s
The Act further regulates the imposition of trusteeships by parent
labor organizations over their subordinate local unions. s Trusteeship is defined in the Act as any method of control whereby a
labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to
a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws. lo Acknowledging that trusteeships are among the most effective devices
which responsible international officers have to ensure order
within their organizations,1I Congress provided that properly
imposed trusteeships are entitled to a presumption of validity. 12
In Benda, the Ninth Circuit held that: 1) federal courts have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute notwithstanding the fact that unfair labor practice charges are pending before
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); 2) District Lodge
508, represented by plaintiff Benda, was entitled to injunctive
relief because the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in its
favor, and it had some chance of success on the merits; and 3)
the district court had abused its discretion by awarding the district lodge attorney's fees. 13
B.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Benda was President of District Lodge 508,14 which represented employees of Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation
(LMSC), one of several wholly owned subsidiaries of Lockheed
Aircraft. Prior to this dispute, the Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (International) had coordinated bargaining between district lodges and
four regional subsidiaries of Lockheed Aircraft, but employees in
each region had voted separately on whether to accept or reject a
contract. In 1977, employees at three plants l5 rejected contract
8. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1976).
11. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 2424, 2437.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1976).
13. 584 F.2d at 319.
14. District Lodge 508 was composed of smaller local unions from two California
counties. It acted as the collective bargaining agent for LMSC employees. Id. at 311.
15. The four regional subsidiaries were LMSC, Lockheed General Company
(GELAC), Lockheed California Company (CALAC), and Lockheed Air Services Company
(LAS). The three plants which rejected the contract were LMSC, GELAC, and CALAC.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13

26

1980]

Robinson
et al.: Labor
Law
LABOR
LAW

385

proposals and went on strike. The International then informed
the district lodges that it intended to engage in corporate-wide
joint unified bargaining,18 thereby requiring a majority vote of all
employees to accept a contract.17
When the management of three of the subsidiaries made
their final offer, two of the regional district lodges l8 decided not
to present the contract to the membership for a vote. The International ruled that this response was tantamount to a rejection of
the offer for all subsidiaries. LMSC union representatives nevertheless voted to present the offer to their membership. Upon
learning that LMSC employees would vote on the contract despite the International's decision, the International President
wired Benda, advising him that it had been determined that an
emergency existed and, that the district lodge representatives
were suspended immediately for "endangering the good and welfare of the Grand Lodge, its local lodges and district lodges as well
as the good and welfare of the organization and the membership."IS The International, in conformity with its constitution and
bylaws, thereby placed District Lodge 508 in trusteeship.20 However, before the International's representatives arrived to take
oveJ; the district lodge, LMSC employees met and voted to accept
their employer's final contract offer and return to work. Still, the
International attempted to continue the strike against LMSC in
order to force Lockheed to continue corporate-wide bargaining. 21
After taking over operation of the district lodge, the International
distributed strike funds and later filed unfair labor practice
charges against Lockheed for refusal to bargain. 22
16. 584 F.2d at 311. Authority for the International's action was derived from International Circular No. 596, published in 1958, which permitted the International President
or an authorized committee to determine whether all bargaining units affected by multiunit agreements with the same employer, company or corporation should be combined for
voting purposes or vote separately or in combination. [d.
17. [d.
18. GELAC and CALAC.
19. 442 F. Supp. at 435.
20. The International did not label its action as the imposition of a trusteeship. 584
F.2d at 312 n.1. However, as the court points out, the Act broadly defines trusteeship to
include "[alny receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control
whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate
body under its constitution or bylaws." 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1976).
21. Employees were thus faced with a dilemma: they could return to work and risk
union discipline or they could honor the picket line and risk dismissal by their employer.
Though the Ninth Circuit makes much of this dilemma, 584 F.2d at 312, it is precisely
the situation faced by many striking workers.
22. The International charged that LMSC violated § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
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Three weeks after the trusteeship was imposed, the district
court issued a preliminary injunction against it. Thus, by court
order, the International was effectively precluded from continuing its bargaining efforts on behalf of LMSC employees. In addition, the injunction signaled an end to corporate-wide bargaining,
and the International was forced to negotiate separate agreements with each of the Lockheed subsidiaries. For all practical
purposes, the underlying dispute between the International and
the district lodge ended once the trusteeship was preliminarily
enjoined. 23 The International could only appeal to the Ninth Circuit to assert its legal right to impose a future trusteeship on a
district lodge under similar circumstances.
C.

THE LEGAL ISSUES: PREEMPTION, ATTORNEY'S FEES, INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

Two of the issues dealt with by the Ninth Circuit, jurisdiction and attorney's fees, were relatively unimportant. Benda adds
little to current law on these issues. The affirmance of injunctive
relief, on the other hand, raises serious legal questions that were
largely left unanswered by the Benda court. These questions include when and under what circumstances a trusteeship may be
imposed, and, once a trusteeship is imposed, what legal and factual showing must be made to enjoin it.
The first minor issue addressed by the Benda court was
whether federal courts were precluded from deciding disputes
under the LMRDA when the underlying issues were pending before the NLRB as part of an unfair labor practice charge. 24 The
preemption doctrine requires that courts defer to NLRB jurisdiction where the activity which is the subject of the court action is
either "arguably protected" by the National Labor Relations Act
or "arguably prohibited" by it. 25 The International, relying on
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1976), by refusing to bargain in good faith. The
NLRB issued a complaint based on this unfair labor practice charge, but took no further
action pending appeal. Since this litigation has effectively resolved the underlying dispute
it appears that the International is no longer pursuing this action.
23. No request for a permanent injunction has been filed. Benda v. Grand Lodge of
Int'I Ass'n, Etc., No. C-77-2761-WWS (N.D. Cal. 1977) (on file at the offices of Golden
Gate University Law Review).
24. For a general discussion of the preemptio!l doctrine, see R. GORMAN, supra note
7, at 766-86; Cox, Labor Law Pre-emption RelJisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 469 (1972); Note, Preemption: A Judicial Headache, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 358 (1976).
25. R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 766.
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San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon,26 argued that because they
had filed unfair labor practice charges, only the NLRB had jurisdiction over the trusteeship dispute. The court found this argument un persuasive because the LMRDA specifically provides
that any member of a labor organization placed in trusteeship
may bring an action for appropriate relief in federal district
court.27 The Ninth Circuit noted that the clear statutory language
was controlling and thus joined the Fifth Circuit 28 in holding that
the preemption doctrine was not applicable to actions brought
pursuant to the LMRDA.29

The second minor issue presented in Benda was whether the
district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to
the district lodge. The court first noted that the grant of preliminary injunctive relief was not a decision on the merits. 30 Thus, in
a strict sense, the district lodge was not a prevailing party. 31 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the district lodge was not
entitled to attorney's fees at this stage of the litigation and reversed the district court.32
The major legal issue in Benda, and the sole topic of the
remainder of this note, is the propriety of granting preliminary
injunctive relief to District Lodge 508. Two questions arise:
whether the standard of review used by the court was appropriate
in view of the factual setting of Benda and whether the court's
application of this standard rendered a just result consistent with
the provisions of the LMRDA. In order to place these issues in
26. 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1976).
28. MacDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. 584 F.2d at 314. Apparently, the NLRB agreed for they declined to intervene in
the International's appeal of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. [d. at
312.
30. [d. at 318.
31. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Significantly, the Ninth Circuit noted that attorney's fees would be appropriate if "the grant of
a preliminary injunction was the primary relief sought and effectively terminated the
action." 584 F.2d at 318. In making such a determination the Ninth Circuit indicated that
a federal court should look to the "practical results" of the grant of relief sought. Yablonski
v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, the Benda court then
sidestepped this very issue; they did not analyze the practical results of their decision,
but merely noted that the International was "actively pursuing this litigation . . . " 584
F.2d at 319. Indeed, at no point in their opinion did the Ninth Circuit discuss the effect
of the grant of the preliminary injunction on the International's efforts to conduct
corporate-wide bargaining.
32. 584 F.2d at 318.
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context, this note begins with the statutory background of the
LMRDA and proceeds to analyze the court's reasoning regarding
the appropriate standard of review and its application.
D.

DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE

The LMRDA: Statutory Background

The LMRDA was enacted in 1959 following two years of congressional investigation of abuses in internal union management. 33 The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in
the Labor Management Field, headed by Senator John McClellan, brought to light a wide variety of instances in which labor
officials had misused union funds, undermined democratic procedures, imposed improper trusteeships, and entered into collusive
agreements with employers. 34 The LMRDA implemented the recommendations of the McClellan Committee by: 1) establishing a
"bill of rights" for union members; 2) requiring periodic reports
from unions and their officers; 3) regulating union election procedures; 4) regulating misappropriation of union funds; 5) prohibiting communists and persons convicted of certain crimes from
holding union office; and 6) regulating trusteeships over local
unions. 35 The Act sets forth specific guidelines for the imposition
of trusteeships, requires reports on trusteeships, and provides a
mechanism for local unions or their members to attack a trusteeship.38
Section 462 of the Act provides that trusteeships must be
imposed in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the
international organization and further sets forth the permissible
purposes for establishing a trusteeship,31 Those purposes are
"correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a
bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or
otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization."38 Section 464 provides that if a trusteeship is established
in conformity with procedures set forth in the organization's con33. R. SLOVENKO, SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR· MANAGEMENT REpORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT OF 1959, at 443·47 (1961).
34. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 47 (1974).
35. [d. at 48.
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461·466 (1976).
37. For pertinent text of § 462, see note 3 supra.
38. [d.
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stitution and bylaws, it is entitled to a presumption of validity
for eighteen months and is not subject to attack except upon clear
and convincing proof. 3D This statutory presumption of validity,
when viewed in light of the open-ended nature of the proper purpose of "otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such
labor organization," indicates that Congress, in attempting to
draw a line between the rights and duties of a local union and
those of the international labor organization, intended to defer
somewhat to the judgment and integrity of the superior organization. 40 Finally, section 464 provides that any union member or
subordinate body may challenge a trusteeship by filing a written
complaint with the Secretary of Labor or by seeking relief in
federal district court.41 Federal courts may, under their general
equitable powers, grant injunctive relief to enjoin a trusteeship.42
Injunctive Relief in the Trusteeship Context

Federal courts have granted injunctive relief in two contexts.
First, injunctions have been issued to prevent43 or terminate 44
trusteeships. Second, relief has been granted to enforce the legal
right of an international to impose a trusteeship on a subordinate
body.45
The grant of a preliminary injunction is usually seen as temporary, not final, relief,48 Quite often there is another step to the
litigation process: the aggrieved party will seek a permanent injunction. Thus, some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, state
that the grant or denial of injunctive relief is not a decision on
the merits,41 The Benda court took such a position, repeatedly
39. For pertinent text of § 464, see note 3 supra.
40. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 2318, 2334.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (l976): for pertinent text, see note 3 supra.
42.1d.
43. Daye v. Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 234 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1964).
44. Schonfeld v. Raftery, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967); United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872 (lOth Cir. 1965).
45. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.
1971).
46. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 814 (1929); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v.
Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1963).
47. Courts have recognized the necessity of addressing the merits. See, e.g., Gordon
v. Laborers Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974); Bailey v. Dixon, 451 F.2d 160 (5th
Cir. 1971); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d
Cir. 1971); Atlanta Fed. and City Servo Employees Local Union 554, v. Service Employees
Int'I Union AFL-CIO, 441 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th
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stating that its decision was not on the merits and that the litigation was continuing even though no permanent injunction was
ever sought. 48
The Standard of Review

Tradi tionally, the standard of review for injunctive relief has
consisted of a four-part test,4U The four factors to be considered
are: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 2) the likelihood
of irreparable harm; 3) how injunctive relief will affect the rights
of the parties involved; and 4) whether granting or denying the
injunction would be in the public interest. 5o Such a test requires
that a court engage in a searching analysis of the underlying
dispute and its ramifications; hence, under this traditional test,
injunctive relief is not easily obtained. 51 Recently, however, some
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have significantly relaxed the
standard of review. 52 This newer standard focuses on balancing
the hardships to the parties resulting from a grant or denial of
relief. 53 "One moving for a preliminary injunction assumes the
Cir. 1970); Schonfeld v. Raftery, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967). There is one situation in
which a court may justifiably decline to reach the merits. When a court refuses to grant
preliminary injunctive relief enjoining a trusteeship and the local union will have another
opportunity to litigate on a motion for a permanent injunction, a court may correctly
decline to delve into the merits of the case. E.g., International Bhd. of Electrical Workers
Local 1186 v. Eli, 307 F. Supp. 495 (D. Hawaii 1969). In Eli, the International's decision
to establish a trusteeship and assume the legal defense of the local union in a twenty
million do\1ar suit was
obviously a "legitimate object". While the case law dealing
with permissible purposes under § 302 [now § 462] does not
specifica\1y answer the question presented in this case, the ultimate answer must depend on factual considerations developed
at the hearing on a permanent injunction. Meanwhile, this
court declines to substitute its judgment over International's
own officers as to whether this particular objective of International was "legitimate".
[d. at 506-07. But Benda is clearly dissimilar. Once the district court enjoined the trusteeship there were no further hearings.
48. 584 F.2d at 318; see note 23 supra.
49. 7 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 65.04, at §§ 66-39 to 69-46 (2d ed. 1976); accord,
Virginia Petro. Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921,925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For a discussion
of the various standards, see Mulligan, Preliminary Injunctions in the Second Circuit, 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 831, 836 (1977).
50. Mu\1igan, supra note 49.
51. Wing v. Arnall, 198 F.2d 571, 674-76 (Emer. Ct. App. 1952).
52. The Second and the Ninth Circuits are the most consistent in applying a relaxed
standard of review. See, e.g., Richter v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 669
F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1977); Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v. Kreps, 548 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.
1977); Charlies Girls v. Revlon, 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1973); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
We\1ington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. Mulligan, supra note 49, at 831.
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burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips strongly in his
favor. . . "54 Under the lenient test, injunctions are more readily
available.
The Benda court chose the modern, more lenient standard
set forth in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking CO.5S The court noted that as the balance of hardships
tipped more decidedly toward one party, that party's need for
demonstrating probable success or the existence of serious questions lessened. 58 Thus, the court asserted that there were not two
separate tests of hardship and probable success, but rather a
"single continuum."s7 Finally, the court noted some "irreducible
minimum" must be shown: either a "fair chance of success on the
merits" or "questions ... serious enough to require litigation."58
There are two major differences between the traditional and
modern standards of review. First, the newer standard strongly
emphasizes the hardships to the parties, a relatively subjective
factor. The likelihood of success, a factor more prone to objective
legal analysis, is deemphasized. Second, the newer standard
eliminates both the public policy concerns and inquiry into how
granting relief will effect the respective rights of the parties.

In certain circumstances, like Benda, the newer standard of
review, making injunctive relief more available, is not appropriate because the grant of injunctive relief effectively terminates
the litigation. s9 In considering injunctive relief, courts should be
careful to create or preserve the status quo so that a court will be
able, upon conclusion of a fair trial, to render a meaningful decision for either party. 80 When, as in Benda, the preliminary injunc54. Wm. Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86,88
(9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
55.Id.
56. 584 F.2d at 315. However, on the issue of hardships, it seems that a showing of
"irreparable injury" must always be made. In Benda, the district court made such a
finding. Id.
57.Id.
58.Id.
59. Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 546
(1978).
SO. Chappell v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tion will dispose of the case, the more searching traditional analysis should be employed. Bt
In Benda, the court simply did not consider whether its decision would dispose of the case. Instead, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly stated that its decision was not on the merits and that the
litigation was continuing. 82 In reality, however, the preliminary
injunction effectively ended the underlying dispute-once the
trusteeship was enjoined, the International was precluded from
bargaining on behalf of LMSC employees and had lost the battle
to engage in corporate-wide bargaining with Lockheed. Thus, the
Benda court's insistence that its decision was not on the merits
is baffling.
Conflict with the LMRDA

Section 464(c) of the Act provides that a trusteeship established in conformity with an international's constitution and bylaws and ratified after a fair hearing shall be presumed valid for
eighteen months subject to attack only upon clear and convincing
proof. B3 In Benda, the court noted that the trusteeship had been
properly established. It also noted the existence of the presumption and concluded that "the presumption of validity applies
here."84 However, the court then proceeded in its analysis as if the
presumption was inoperative when the merits of the case were not
before the court. Had the court applied the more stringent test,
the presumption could have been accorded its proper weight.
The standard of review utilized by the Benda court conflicts
with the presumption of validity. While the standard of review
simply calls for balancing the hardships and a showing of some
chance of success on the merits, the Act itself provides a presumption of validity rebuttable only upon clear and convincing
61. Only one other trusteeship case has been decided using the modern standard of
review. San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 525 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1975).
However, San Filippo is distinguishable from Benda. In San Filippo, the district court,
using the traditional four-part standard of review, denied a local union injunctive relief
because it had failed to show irreparable injury. The Second Circuit, noting that the
standard of review placed too heavy a burden on the local union, nonetheless affirmed
because a showing of irreparable injury was a core requirement of injunctive relief. Thus,
neither the district court nor the Second Circuit felt compelled to discuss the question of
the likelihood of success on the merits.
62. 584 F.2d at 318.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1976); for text of § 464(c), see note 3 supra.
64. 584 F.2d at 316 n.4.
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proof. 85 This conflict or anomaly is brought into sharp focus by
the Benda decision because the court refused to consider the merits. Thus, the court virtually ignored the legal problem posed by
the apparent conflict between the relaxed standard \)f review and
the strict statutory presumption. 88
Application of the Hardships-Probable Success Balance
After explaining the Inglis test, the Benda court began to
apply it by discussing the relative hardships to the parties created
by the trusteeship. Because the International was dispensing
strike funds from the district lodge's treasury, and because the
lodge was losing members, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that continued imposition of the trusteeship would cause the district lodge irreparable injuryY The harm
to the International resulting from failure to pursue corporatewide bargaining, and to its entire membership, was never adequately considered. The court "recognized that maintenance of
control over subordinate groups is a reasonable concern."8S However, the court rejected this factor as not "the kind of irreparable
injury with which equity is concerned, "89 thus concluding that
any injury to the International was far outweighed by by the harm
to the district lodge.
Far more important than the court's discussion of hardships
was its novel approach to the issue of probable success on the
merits (i.e., that the injunction against the trusteeship would be
upheld). In its application of this part of the test, the court never
clearly elucidated what factors would constitute either a fair
chance of success on the merits or an important question requiring litigation. Rather, the court applied a hybrid standard: was
there a "good faith doubt" that this trusteeship had been imposed for a proper purpose?70
The Act provides that the proper purposes of a trusteeship
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

29 U.S.C. § 464(c)(1976).
584 F.2d at 316 nnA & 5.
[d. at 315.
[d.
[d.
70. [d. at 316. It is unclear how the court's analysis of a "good faith doubt" corresponds to the "clear and convincing evidence" standard required to rebut the statutory
presumption of validity.
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include "correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring
performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties
of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures,
or otherwis~ carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor
organization."71 The International contended that the Benda
trusteeship fit within both the "collective bargaining" and
"legitimate objects" rubrics.
Taking a narrow view of proper purpose, the Benda panel
found that there was a good faith doubt that this trusteeship had
a proper purpose. Specifically, the court rejected the International's argument that the proper purpose of the trusteeship was
to ensure performance of the duties of the bargaining representative.72 Rather, it concluded that the nature and scope of bargaining duties as between the district lodge and the International
were unclear. Accordingly, it held that the trusteeship, imposed
for the purpose of continuing corporate-wide bargaining, raised
serious questions that could be litigated. Finally, the court rejected the International's contention that "union selfpreservation" legitimized the trusteeship imposed upon the district lodge. 73
Within the collective bargaining arena, the Act recognizes
two distinguishable proper purposes for imposition of trusteeship.74 First, the Act provides that enforcement of preexisting
collective bargaining agreements is proper. 75 For example, if a
local union indicates that it will strike even though the collective
bargaining agreement contains a no strike clause, the international may respond by placing the local in trusteeship.78 Second,
the Act states that a proper purpose would be "assuring the performance of ... other duties of a bargaining representative."77 In
Gordon v. Laborers International Union of North America,78 the
71. 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
72. 584 F.2d at 316. See 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
73. 584 F.2d at 317.
74. [d.
75. Virtually all trusteeship cases involving collective bargaining have dealt with this
issue. See, e.g., Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449
F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1970).
76. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.
1971).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1976).
78. 490 F.2d 133 (lOth Cir. 1974).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13

36

1980]

Robinson et al.: Labor Law

LABOR LAW

395

local union refused to associate with a district counciPU and
reached a separate agreement with the employer that failed to
provide for health and welfare and pension benefits. The International imposed a trusteeship on the grounds that failure to provide for such benefits constituted failure to perform the duties of
a bargaining representative. The Tenth Circuit agreed and upheld the trusteeship.8o
The analogy to Benda is clear: the district lodge refused to
join in continued corporate-wide bargaining, the apparent purpose of which was to establish standards applicable to all employees in the industry, and instead reached a separate agreement
with the employer. The court never addressed the differences in
the contracts obtained; rather it asserted that since the division
of responsibilities between the district lodge and the International were unclear, a "good faith doubt" as to proper purpose
existed. 8'
The Benda court, failing to adequately deal with the International's contentions regarding bargaining duties, established a
new standard: the court would defer to an international's notion
of such duties only when the international was attempting to
enforce "reasonably definite and precise collective bargaining responsibilities."82 Because the bargaining responsibilities in Benda
were thought imprecise, the court noted that it would be
"reluctant to allow a district court to rely solely on the collective
bargaining rationale for imposing a trusteeship. "83
However, in Benda, the International was not relying solely
on the collective bargaining rationale; they also contended that
their action furthered "other legitimate objects of a labor organization."8. Here, too, the court narrowly construed the International's contentions and established another new standard. The
court noted that because "legitimate objects" was not defined in
•

79. Cf, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Brown. 343 F.2d 872 (lOth Cir. 1965)
(refusal to associate with a district council was not. in and of itself. sufficient grounds for
imposing a trusteeship on a local union).
80. 490 F.2d at 137. The Gordon court further noted that when imposition of a
trusteeship turned on a question of the judgment of union officials. courts should be
reluctant to intercede.
81. 584 F.2d at 317.
82. [d.
83. [d.
84. [d. See 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). For the text of the statute. see note 3 supra.
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the statute, "[a]n object of questionable legitimacy therefore
subjects the trusteeship itself to good faith doubt."85 Thus, under
the Ninth Circuit's somewhat circular reading of the statute, virtually any trusteeship imposed under the "legitimate objects"
rubic could be enjoined. 86
The court's discussion of "legitimate objects" failed to correctly characterize the International's stated motive for imposing
the trusteeship, which was to protect itself from impotence as a
labor organization. The Ninth Circuit termed this contention
"self preservation, standing naked and alone."87 However, the
goal of self preservation flows from the very nature of labor management relations. Indeed, the rationale behind the National
Labor Relations Act was that employees must be able to band
together and engage in concerted activity for their own self protection. 88 The Benda court ignored the self preservation rationale
and further ignored the Senate report on the trusteeship provisions of the LMRDA, which seems to have recognized self preservation as being a legitimate object of a trusteeship.89 By way of
contrast, the Second Circuit in National Association of Letter
Carriers v. Sombrotto 90 noted that "[t]he union is entitled to
protect itself, and actions taken toward this end appear to us
directed toward a 'legitimate object' within the meaning of 29
U.S.C. § 462."81
The Benda court dismissed Sombrotto on the grounds that
it involved self-preservation in the context of "well defined collective bargaining responsibilities ... "82 But in doing so, the
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize the relationship between collec85. 584 F.2d at 316.
86. The last statistical study of trusteeships indicates that fully 75% of them have
been imposed under the rubric of "legitimate objects." Beaird, supra note 3, at 512.
87. 584 F.2d at 317.
88. Section 7, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); Statement of
Purpose, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
89. The Senate Report noted that trusteeships were proper "to preserve the integrity
and stability of the organization itself." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2318, 2333.
90. 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971).
91. [d. at 922. Accord, Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners, 477 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973) (trusteeship imposed for the purpose of preventing
the local union from petitioning the NLRB for disaffiliation and separate certification was
among the legitimate objects within the meaning of section 462 of the Act); McVicker v.
International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (district court upheld
a trusteeship imposed for the purpose of preventing the local union from disaffiliation).
92. 584 F.2d at 317.
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tive bargaining responsibilities and self preservation. In Benda,
the International attempted to conduct corporate-wide collective
bargaining in order to pressure Lockheed Aircraft into signing a
contract that would uniformly benefit its members. District
Lodge 508 undercut this attempt by refusing to accede to the
parent body's judgment as to the necessity for such a bargaining
posture. These facts tend to show the interrelation between self
preservation and the fulfillment of collective bargaining responsibilities.
Additionally, the International's action can be viewed in the
context of union discipline. Several cases involving trusteeships
have dealt with the issue of union discipline under the "other
legitimate objects" rubric. 93 These cases have focused on the relationship between the local and international union and the duties, responsibilities, and benefits flowing between the two. A
local union, as part .of a larger organization, gives up some of its
rights in order to reap the benefits of concerted action. 94 Thus,
where the local union wishes to stay within the international, it
should. not be immune from discipline by the international
body.95 Failure to comply with the reasonable demands of a parent body subjects a local to such discipline. 98 In Benda, the International constitution specifically provided that a trusteeship
could be imposed. The need for such discipline, in the context of
the International's attempt to deal with a large and powerful
employer, should have tipped the balance in favor of the trusteeship. The court failed to recognize the possibility that international organizations have nation-wide collective bargaining responsibilities which may require local unions to accede to the necessity of common action. A trusteeship imposed to accomplish
this end surely has as its purpose a "legitimate object."

E.

SIGNIFICANCE

Benda stands for the proposition that in granting preliminary injunctive relief to a local union in trusteeship the key ele93. Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915
(2d Cir. 1971); McVicker v. International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp.296 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
94. McVicker v. International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. at 303.
95. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d at 923, quoted
in Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d at 615.
96. See Gordon v. Laborers Infl Union, 490 F.2d at 137; McVicker v. International
Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. at 303.
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ment is the relative hardships to the parties. U7 As the hardships
tip more decidedly toward one party the necessity of showing a
likelihood of success on the merits decreases. The statutory presumption will not weigh in that balance upon review of preliminary injunctive relief since the merits will not be reached until
fully litigated at the permanent injunction hearing. This
"merits" analysis will apply even where the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief effectively terminates the dispute between the
parties. In this respect, Benda is a unique decision, and therefore
may be limited to its facts. No other decision involving trusteeships has skirted the merits when preliminary injunctive relief
was the primary relief sought and effectively terminated the action. u8
Benda also represents a narrow reading by the Ninth Circuit
of the proper purposes for imposing a trusteeship. An attempt to
adjust collective bargaining duties between a local and international will apparently subject any subsequent trusteeship to a
good faith doubt that it was imposed for a proper purpose. Benda
holds that a trusteeship will only be upheld when imposed to
enforce "reasonably definite and precise collective bargaining responsibilities." Thus, Benda significantly limits an international's
flexibility to adjust its bargaining posture to contend with
changes in the industry.

The truly significant limitation of the purpose for which a
trusteeship may properly be imposed results from the court's interpretation of "legitimate objects." Because the Benda court did
not apply the statutory presumption, any trusteeship imposed
under the legitimate objects rubric would seem to be subject to a
good faith doubt that it was imposed for a proper purpose under
the Act. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's reading of the trusteeship provisions of the LMRDA, international unions would be
prevented from placing local unions in trusteeship except in certain well defined situations.
Under Benda, international unions must meet stringent
standards to impose trusteeships, absent clear-cut abuse by local
unions. Also, international unions will not have the flexibility
needed to deal with changing work patterns and rapidly evolving
97. Benda has been cited for its standard ofreview. City of Anaheim v. Kleppe, 590
F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 1978).
98. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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corporate structure. Benda's implication that an international
must rigidly adhere to outmoded collective bargaining patterns
while the corporate employer may make adjustments is grossly
unfair. Limiting an international's flexibility will only help shift
the relative strength of the parties toward the corporate employer. To respond to this situation, international unions would
be well advised to include authority for corporate-wide bargaining in their constitutions. Perhaps, if such authority were more
specifically delegated to the international, courts might be more
apt to approve intervention when a local refuses to accede to the
reasonable demands of the international union.

F.

CONCLUSION

The Benda court did not consider the practical realities underlying the dispute between District Lodge 508 and the International; it did not recognize that the grant of a preliminary injunction effectively terminated the litigation or that the International
and District Lodge 508 had a unique collective bargaining relationship. As a result, it failed to reach the merits of the dispute
or to fully confront the legal issues. Specifically, the court mistakenly failed to apply the statutory presumption of validity to the
trusteeship and to require that the district lodge present clear and
convincing evidence that the trusteeship was not imposed for a
proper purpose. Finally, the Benda court narrowly construed the
trusteeship provisions of the Act, virtually eliminating
"legitimate objects" as a proper purpose.
Robert Haden

ill. REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF OSHA REGULATIONS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor' (Todd), the
Ninth Circuit affirmed an order of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission 2 (Commission) finding that Todd
Shipyards Corp. (Todd or the employer) had "repeatedly" violated workplace safety regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act3
1. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Anderson,
J. and Palmieri, D.J.)
2. OSARHRC Docket No. 12510 (Dec. 22, 1975), 3 OSHC 1813 (1975).
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). For
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(OSHA or the Act).
OSHA was enacted in 1970 in response to a very real crisis
in American industry. In the years immediately preceding passage of the Act, over 14,000 job-related deaths were reported each
year.4 In addition, over two million workers were disabled annually through job-related accidents. 5 In purely economic terms,
the impact of occupational accidents and diseases was overwhelming. a In human terms the cost was incalculable. Most private employers were not seriously addressing the problemj 7 far too
often employers rationalized worker injuries as simply the cost of
doing business. 8 As a result, at the time of the passage of the Act
these problems were getting worse, not better.& It was in this
context, after nearly three years of debate and intense privateemployer opposition, that Congress passed the Act.1O
The stated purpose of OSHA is "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions .... "11 To this end the Act empowers the
Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to set standards to assure employees non-harardous working conditions. 12 Section 8(a) of OSHA
authorizes the Secretary or his representatives to inspect workplaces for hazards or violations of OSHA regulations. 13 If hazards
or violations are discovered, an inspector must issue a citation to
the employer.u Thereafter, the employer is notified of the penalty, if any, that the Secretary proposes to assess. 15 The system
general information on OSHA, see M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW
(1978); R. HOGAN & R. HOGAN, OCCUPATiONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (1977).
4. S. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178.
5.ld.
6. Estimates of the economic cost, in terms of the annual loss to the Gross National
Product, range upwards from $8 billion. [d.
7. D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB 54-61 (1978); Nader, Forward in J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES xiii (1973).
8. Id. See generally E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS: ELEMENTS OF COST·
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1973). See also R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
34-37 (1976).
9. S. REP. No. 91-1291, supra note 4, at 5180.
10. J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 167-89.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
12. Id. § 651(b)(3) (1976). Section 651(b)(3) further directs the Secretary to create a
review commission to handle OSHA adjudicatory matters.
13. [d. § 657(a) (1976).
14. [d. § 658(8) (1976).
15. [d. § 659(8) (1976).
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of penalties is designed to provide employers with an incentive to
comply with the safety requirements of the Act. '8 For non-serious
violations, penalties are discretionary; 17 for serious violations penalties are mandatory;'8 but in either case, the maximum penalty
is $1,000.19 A willful violation may involve a penalty of up to
$10,000. 20 If an employer fails to prevent recurrences and a subsequent inspection turns up another violation involving a similar
hazard to employees, the employer has repeatedly violated the
standards and a penalty of up to $10,000 may be assessed. 21 The
question of what constitutes "repeatedly" violating OSHA standards was the principal issue in the Todd decision.
The Todd Court held: 1) that the employer "repeatedly"
violated the Act where the citation involved a recurrence at the
same facility of a hazard similar to those described in earlier
citations;22 2) that the citation for having repeatedly violated the
Act provided sufficient notice to the employer even though it
failed to specify the earlier violation upon which the repeat violation was based;23 and 3) that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Marshall u. Barlow's Inc., 24 requiring a search
warrant for a non-consensual OSHA inspection of an employer's
premises, would not be retroactively applied so as to exclude
evidence of violations obtained in a warrantless pre-Barlow's
search. 25
16. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, supra note 4, at 5192-93; CONF. REp. No. 91-1765, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5228, 5237-38.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1976).
18. Id. § 666(b) (1976).
19. Id. § 666(a), (b) (1976).
20. Id. § 666(a) (1976). If a willful violation results in the death of an employee, the
employer may be fined up to $10,000, or, upon conviction, imprisoned for up to six months,
or both. If the employer has previously been convicted under this section, the fine may
be increased up to $20,000. Id.
21. Id. § 666(a) (1976). Penalty provisions for both willful and repeated violations are
contained in this same subsection, which provides: "Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to
this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation."
Id.
A repeat citation must be distinguished from a citation for failure to cure a prior
violation. Section 17(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976), provides penalties for failure
to abate a violation in penalties of up to $1,000 "for each day during which such failure
or violation continues." Id.
22. 586 F.2d at 687.
23. Id. at 688.
24. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
25. 586 F.2d at 689.
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Although the holding in Todd is hardly startling, the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of "repeated" violations under OSHA
highlights a split in the circuits. 28 Further, Todd is the first postBarlow's case to deal with the retroactive application of the Supreme Court decision. 27

B.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Todd, a New York based corporation, operates a shipbuilding and ship repair facility in San Pedro, California. 28 On August
30, and October 29, 1974, Todd was cited for "repeat" violations
of an OSHA regulation requiring employers to provide employees
working more than five feet above a solid surface with a proper
scaffold or ladder.29 On January 30, 1975, Todd was again cited
for a "repeat" violation of the same regulation. Todd contested
the January 30 citation under section 10(c) of the Act. 30
26. See notes 36 to 42 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 48 to 51 infra and accompanying text.
28. 586 F.2d at 684.
29. The regulation is contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1916.47(b) (1976), and provides in
pertinent part:
When employees are working aloft, or elsewhere at elevations
more than 5 feet above a solid surface, either scaffolds or a
sloping ladder, meeting the requirements of this subpart, shall
be used to afford safe footing, or the employees shall be pro·
tected by safety belts and lifelines meeting the requirements of
§ 1916.84(b).
Todd did not contest these citations and, accordingly, they became final orders of the
Commission pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
Unfortunately, the specific facts surrounding Todd's violations are not known. The
inspector's citations merely described the general nature of the alleged violation. 586 F.2d
at 684 n.3. In addition, the parties to this litigation stipulated to the facts. Id. at 685 n.
4.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that failure to provide scaffolding or other suitable
safety equipment may subject workers to particularly serious injury. Thus, many states
have enacted specific legislation requiring the use of scaffolding. See, e.g., Ill. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, §§ 60·69 (1973). For a discussion of the Illinois Scaffold Act see Ring, The
Scaffold Act: Its Past, Present & Future, 64 ILL. B.J. 666·80 (1976). California has had
a similar code provision since 1913. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7150·58 (West 1971).
There is an apparent discrepancy as to inspection dates in the Todd opinion. The first
inspection which revealed a violation of the scaffold regulation is noted to have occurred
on August 30, 1974. 586 F.2d at 684. Later, on the same page of the opinion, the court
mentions the date as having been August 27. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976). Todd was cited for other violations during the January
30 inspection but because these violations do not figure in the Ninth Circuit's resolution
of Todd, further discussion of them has been omitted.
As a result of the JanUfuy 30 inspection, Todd was also cited for a repeat violation of
29 C.F.R. § 1916.51(b) (1976), failing to maintain "good housekeeping conditions." The
administrative law judge concluded that the "repeat" violations of the regulation should
be struck from the January 30 citation and the Commission agreed. Because the Secretary
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An administrative law judge found that the violations were
not identical and did not occur on the same vessel. 31 The judge
ruled that "repeat" violations must be committed "more than
once" and "in a manner which 'flaunts' [sic] the requirements
of the Act."32 Because he found that the violations did not manifest a flouting of the Act, the judge concluded the January 30
violation could not be the basis of a repeat citation. 33
The Secretary of Labor then petitioned the Commission to
review the decision of the administrative law judge. 34 The Commission reversed and imposed a fine of $160 for the January 30
"repeat" violation. 35 Todd appealed. 38
C.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED

Repeat Violations
The Todd court dealt with three legal issues. The first issue
involved interpreting the meaning of "repeatedly." Todd asked
the Ninth Circuit to join the Third Circuit37 in holding that penalties for repeatedly violating OSHA regulations should be imposed
only when the employer had flouted OSHA standards through at
least three violations of the same regulation. However, the Todd
Court declined to adopt this interpretation. 3s Instead, the court
held that penalties for repeatedly violating OSHA safety regulations could be assessed whenever a citation involved a recurrence
at the same facility of a hazard similar to those described in
earlier citation. 3u In support of this conclusion, the Court first
noted that Congress authorized fines in order to encourage comdid not cross appeal the Commission ruling, the repeat charge on the second housekeeping
violation was not before the court in Todd. The repeat charge for violation of the scaffold
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1916.47(b), resulted from a third violation of the standard. Therefore. the court's language. defining a repeat violation as a second occurrence, can arguably
be considered dictum.
31. 586 F.2d at 684.
32. [d.
33. [d.

34. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976) provides authority for this review.
35. 3 OSHC 1813 (1975).
36. Authority for appeal of a Commission order is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)
(1976).
37. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 540
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976); Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 146 (1977).
38. 586 F.2d at 686.
39. [d. at 687. Though this issue appears clear cut, there are limits to the Todd
Court's holding vis-a-vis "repeated" violations. See notes 74 to 78 infra and accompanying
text.
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pliance with OSHA regulations!O Thus, when those fines failed
to achieve the desired result and employers continued to violate
the same safety regulations greater penalties were needed to insure future compliance!' The Court further noted that the Secretary of Labor had cited Todd on several occasions. Because the
penalties imposed had not proved adequate to deter another violation, the court concluded that the more severe sanctions for
repeatedly violating the regulations were properly imposed. In
sum, a second citation could trigger the enhanced penalty for
repeated violations!2
Notice

Todd next contended that the Secretary's January 30 cita40. 586 F.2d at 686.
41. [d.

42. The Act does not mandate the Commission to impose enhanced penalties for
repeat citations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976); see note 21 supra. Nevertheless, if penalties
are assessed the Commission must consider "the size of the business of the employer being
charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of
previous violations." 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1976). These factors must figure in every computation of a penalty under the Act. [d.
The OSHA Field Operations Manual, Part XI - C 8 b, c, and d, sets forth the following
mandatory guidelines for inspectors assessing a penalty for repeat violations:
b. Gravity and penalty factors.
For repeated violations which are not willful, the gravity of
each violation will be evaluated and new penalty determined
as for serious and other violations. Although an alleged violation(s) is a repetition of a previous violation, it may differ in
one factor or more relating to gravity; therefore, gravity must
be reassessed for each repetition. Absent special circumstances,
once the gravity based penalty is arrived at, it is doubled for
the first repeated violation and quadrupled if the violation has
been cited and repeated twice. If a third repetition of a previous
violation occurs, multiply the gravity-based penalty by 10. For
any further repetition the Areas Director should consult with
the Regional Administrator who may in tum consult with the
Regional Solicitor.
c. No initial proposed penalty.
If there was no initial proposed penalty assessed for a violation,
the minimum gravity-based penalty, absent special circumstances, shall be $100 for a repeat violation.
d. Adjustment factors.
In calculating the adjusted penalty, the adjustment factors
(except size) should be recalculated downward. Good faith
would ordinarily not be applied since the employer has exhibited a lack of good faith by repeating the violation. The history
factor shall take into consideration all previously cited violation(s).
U.S. DEpt'. OF LABOR, OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 87 (CCH ed. 1979).
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tion contravened the Act's notice requirement because it did not
"describe with particularity" the earlier violations which formed
the basis for the "repeat" citation. 43 The Todd Court easily disposed of this issue}4 First, the court noted that citations should
be "liberally read. "45 Second, because all the citations referred to
the same regulation number, "Todd could easily have determined
which earlier citations were the basis for the repeat charge."48
Finally, Todd could simply have requested more detailed information. 47
Retroactive Application of Barlow's

Third, Todd contended that Barlow's should be retroactively
applied and that all evidence seized in the warrantless search of
its premises should be excluded as fruit of a violation of the fourth
amendment. However, Barlow's involved an action for declaratory relief and merely held that non-consensual warrantless
searches by OSHA inspectors were violative offourth amendment
rights,4s Barlow's did not address the application ofthe exclusion43. The notice requirement contained in 29 U .S.C. § 658(a) (1976) provides that each
citation "shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a reference
to the provisions of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or order alleged to have been
violated. "
44. This is not to imply that the notice issue is always so easy. In Todd, the Court
limited its notice holding to the facts. 586 F .2d at 688.
45. Id. at 687. "Liberally read" refers to the liberal construction afforded administrative pleadings. "Enforcement of the Act would be crippled if the Secretary were inflexibly
held to a narrow construction of citations issued by his inspectors." National Realty and
Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257,1264 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
46. 586 F.2d at 687.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1976) provides that Commission records shall be open and
available to the public.
48. 436 U.S. at 325. To date the most complete treatment of Barlow's is contained
in Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Administrative Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 9 ENVT'L L. 149 (1978). For briefer treatment of Barlow's see Note, Search
Warrants, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: OSHA Needs a
Warrant, 57 N.C. L. REV. 320 (1979); Note, OSHA Warrantless Unconsented Administrative Inspections of Business Premises Held Unconstitutional, 55 N.D. L. Rev. 95 (1979);
Note, Warrant Requirement for OSHA Inspections, 46 TENN. L. REV. 446 (1979); Note,
Propriety of Warrantless Searches by OSHA Inspectors, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 815 (1979)
Note, Administrative Searches, 92 HARv. L. REV. 210 (1978); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. and the Warrant Requirement for OSHA "Spot Check" Inspections, 15 IDAHO L. REv.
187 (1978); Note, Administrative Searches, 14 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 119 (1978).
The Supreme Court in Barlow's also set forth probable cause guidelines for obtaining
warrants for OSHA searches. The Court did not require probable cause in the criminal
law sense, but rather mandated a variable standard. For purposes of an administrative
search such as this probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not
only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable
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ary rule to OSHA searches.
The Todd court had little difficulty with this issue. The
court began by noting that the Supreme Court had never applied
the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding.48 Also, the exclusionary rule has not been retroactively applied in many criminal
cases. 5O Because OSHA inspectors were acting "pursuant to apparent congressional authority" under "then-prevailing constitutional norms" neither the deterrent effect of the exch,lsionary rule
nor the imperative of judicial integrity would be served by excluding evidence of the dangerous condition discovered on Todd's
premises. 51
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an. . . inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular [establishment]." 436 U.S. at 320, citing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 533, 538 (1967).
But these guidelines are hardly specific. Thus, lower courts have been left with the
task of fleshing out probable cause requirements under Barlow's.
In California, the State Court of Appeal for the Fifth District recently held that
because criminal sanctions permeated the penalty provisions of California OSHA
(Cal/OSHA), CAL. LAB. CODE § 6300·6708 (Deering Supp. 1979) (enacted in 1973), inspection warrants must meet criminal probable cause requirements. Salwasser Mfg. Inc. v.
Municipal Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 223 (1979). The California Legislature reacted to
Salwasser by enacting legislation defining probable cause criteria for CAL/OSHA inspection warrants as follows:
. Cause for the issuance of a warrant shall be deemed to exist if
there has been an industrial accident, injury, or illness reported, if any complaint that violations of occupational safety
and health standards exist at the place of employment has been
received by the division, or if the place of employment to be
inspected has been chosen on the basis of specific neutral criteria contained in a general administrative plan for the enforcement of this division.
1979 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 241, § l(b) (West 1979) (enacted July 10, 1979) (to be codified
as CAL. LAB. CODE § 6314(b».
A nation-wide survey of post-Barlow's litigation on the issue of the warrant requirement and probable cause is beyond the scope of this case note. Since there is no apparent
consensus on its interpretation, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will be called
upon to more clearly define its holding in Barlow's.
49. 586 F.2d at 689.
50. 1d. at 689-90.
51. 1d. at 690. There are two rationales for the exclusionary rule. First, excluding
illegally seized evidence is designed to deter police misconduct. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). Second, exclusion of illegal evidence is said to further "the imperative of
judicial integrity." United States V. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975). The Todd Court's
analysis of retroactive application of the exclusionary rule to OSHA searches was followed
in Savina Home Industries V. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979). In
Savina, the Tenth Circuit defined the issue thus: "[A]ssuming that the exclusionary rule
would be available in any event, the issue is whether the rule is retroactively applicable
to a pre-Barlow's inspection." 1d. at 1363. The court concluded that retroactive application would neither further the imperative of judicial integrity nor deter police misconduct.
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Of the three issues presented, only the interpretation of
"repeatedly" makes new law. Retroactive application of the exclusionary rule presented the Todd Court with a "novel" subject
for discussion;52 nevertheless, this issue was rather simple in view
of the precedent. The more important issue revolved around the
definition of "repeatedly." Accordingly, the remainder of this
note addresses that topic alone.
D.

DISCUSSION AND CRmQUE

Todd was not the first case in which the Ninth Circuit was
called upon to interpret the meaning of "repeatedly." In a similar
case one year prior to Todd, the Court affirmed a Commission
ruling assessing, against the same employer, a penalty for repeatedly violating OSHA regulations. In Todd Shipyards v. Secretary
of Labor (Todd Shipyards),53 the Ninth Circuit held that
"violations which were identical in character, occurred on the
same ship and took place within three months of each other" were
properly classified as repeated. 5• However, in Todd Shipyards the
Court limited its holding to the facts of that case; the Ninth
Circuit did not address the general question of what constitutes
a repeat violation. 55 Nonetheless, in Todd Shipyards the Court
rejected the Third Circuit's definition of a repeat violation as set
forth in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Bethlehem
Steel). se

•

The Third Circuit's definition of "repeatedly" hinged on a .
narrow reading of the Act. First, the Third Circuit, using a dictionary definition of the term, determined that "repeatedly," the
adverbial form of the noun, meant "again and again."57 Thus, the
Court concluded that the second violation of a regulation could
never form the basis of a citation for repeatedly violating OSHA
standards. 58 Next, the Third Circuit equated "repeatedly" with
"willfully" because both terms formed the basis for the same
Therefore, the court held that the rule, if applied at all, should only be applied prospec·
tively. [d.
52. 586 F.2d at 688.
53. 566 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (per Ely, J.j the other panel members were Kennedy,
J. and Ferguson, D.J.).
54. [d. at 1331.
55. [d. at 1331 n. 6.
56. [d. at 1331. 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976).
57. [d. at 160.
58. [d. at 162.
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penalty under the Act: civil fines of up to $10,000. 59 Accordingly,
the court held that in order to assess a penalty for repeatedly
violating OSHA standards, the employer would have had to violate the same standard more than twice, in a manner which evidenced a flouting of the Act. 50
In Todd Shipyards, the Ninth Circuit wisely rejected this
analysis. 81 First, they noted that the dictionary definition of
"repeatedly" did not comport with the legislative h.istory of the
Act.82 Indeed, the Conference Committee on OSHA used the
terms "repeatedly" and "repeated" interchangeably.83 Thus, the
Court found that a strict interpretation of the word, based on its
adverbial form in the Act, was not required. Second, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the terms "repeatedly" and "willfully"
were joined by the disjunctive "or."B4 Therefore, there was no
evidence that Congress intended that the terms have the same
meaning. 55 .
In Todd, the Court reiterated these criticisms of the Third
Circuit's test for repeated violations. 55 The court did not limit this
holding to the facts of the case, but rather joined the Fourth
Circuit in establishing a general standard for repeat citation:'7 a
"recurrence at the same facility of a hazard similar to those described in the earlier citation," will expose the employer to penalties for repeatedly violating an OSHA standard. 88
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

1d. at 161.
1d. at 162.
566 F.2d at 1331.
Id. at 1330-31 n.fi.
CONF. REp. No. 91-1765, supra note 16, at 5237·38.
566 F.2d at 1331.
65. 1d. at 1331 n.5. As to penalties, the court noted that OSHA vested the Secretary
with discretion to assess appropriate fines that would help insure future compliance with
OSHA standards. As the Todd Shipyards court viewed the Act, willful violations were in
general more serious than repeated violations but it was nonetheless important that the
Secretary have the discretion to enforce OSHA as he saw fit, taking into consideration
the peculiarities of each individual case.
66. 586 F.2d at 686. In addition, the Todd court noted that the Third Circuit's view
of repeated violations would result in virtual elimination of repeat violation penalties.
This fear had also been voiced in Todd Shipyards. 566 F.2d at 1331 n.6.
67. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978). However, the Todd Court declined to adopt the Fourth
Circuit's more sweeping definition of "repeatedly." The Hyman Court held that only "a
single prior infraction need be proven to invoke the repeated violation sanctions authorized by the Act." 1d. at 839.
68. 586 F.2d at 687.
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The split in the circuits over the definition of "repeatedly,"
combined with OSHA's venue provisions, creates a curious anomaly that will undoubtedly affect future litigation of other OSHA
provisions. The Act provides that an employer may raise legal
issues concerning OSHA in one of three places: the circuit where
a violation occurs, the circuit where the employer has its principal
office or in the District of Columbia Circuit. au With the split in
the circuits, an employer could conceivably obtain relief in its
principal office's circuit even though it would be denied relief in
the circuit where the violation occurred. For example, the repeat
violation which formed the basis of the Third Circuit's holding in
Bethlehem Steel actually occurred at the San Pedro, California
shipyard, the situs of the Todd case. 70 However, because Bethlehem was a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in that state, it brought its action in the Third Circuit and
obtained relief. Todd, a New York corporation, sought relief in
the Ninth Circuit, where the violation occurred, and was denied
relief. The problems of OSHA enforcement caused by this forum
shopping opportunity are obvious: an OSHA inspector will not
know what standard to apply when inspecting two employers
with side-by-side facilities.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that so much litigation should occur over the definition of "repeatedly." Perhaps
this results from general employer opposition to OSHA or fear
that the Commission will assess larger penalties in the future.71
But even so, neither Congress nor the courts should escape blame
for this situation. The use of the term "repeatedly" without statutory definition in the Act is clearly a case of poor drafting. 72 Fur69. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
70. 540 F.2d at 158-59.
71. The penalty imposed in Todd was $160. 586 F.2d at 685. In Todd Shipyards, two
separate repeat violations resulted in total fines of $1,050. 566 F.2d at 1329. The fine in
Bethlehem Steel was only $60. 540 F.2d at 159. Obviously, these large corporations were
not litigating over· the definition ofrepeatedly because of the fines ill}posed. Perhaps this
willingness to engage in expensive litigation can be better characterized as an attempt to
limit OSHA in any way possible. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, supra note 7, at 187.
72. This is not surprising given the circumstances surrounding enactment of OSHA.
There was intense pressure on Congress from every side, the Executive, business, and
labor. For an interesting description and discussion of OSHA's birth, see J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 167-89. Congress could perhaps have prevented this plethora of
litigation by placing the penalty provisions for willful and repeat violations in separate
subparagraphs, and by using the adjectival form of each word. The Commission would
still have the authority to develop a more precise working definition of the terms and could
ameliorate harshness through discretionary use of penalty enhancement.
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ther, the courts only invite relitigation of identical legal issues
when they limit their holding to the facts of claim that they "need
not dispose" of core issues. 73 In this light, Todd can hardly be
faulted for asking the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the very arguments made one year earlier in Todd Shipyards.
Unfortunately, Todd does not seem to provide a final answer
on the meaning of "repeatedly." The Ninth Circuit strongly
hinted that there are limits to its holding. First, the Todd court
held that a repeat citation must be based on a recurrence of a
similar hazard. 74 However, the court did not explain the meaning
of a "similar" hazard, but merely noted that a similar hazard was
involved in Todd. 75 Second, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its holding in Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission 78 that a penalty may only be assessed ifthe employer
"knew or should have known of the existence of an employee
violation."77 Finally, the Todd Court expressly left open the question of whether a repeat citation could be vitiated by the passage
of time.1S Thus it would seem that Todd or others may relitigate
these issues. 78 The Ninth Circuit holding in Todd is that a
"repeat" citation, with concomitant penalties, may be founded
upon a recurrence of a hazard similar to that described in earlier
citations, and that the exclusionary rule will not be retroactively
applied to a pre-Barlow's warrantless search.

E.

CONCLUSION

Citations for repeat violations of OSHA standards are an
important part of the scheme for achieving employer compliance
73. 566 F.2d at 1331 n.6.
74. 586 F.2d 687.
75. [d. at 686 n.7.
76. 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976).
77. [d. at 1145.
78. 586 F.2d at 687 n.8.
79. The Court's method of dismissing issues that it feels are not germane to Todd
invites further litigation. For example, the court sidestepped the question of how similar
the hazards ·must be by limiting its holding to the particular facts in Todd. [d. at 686
n.7. Similarly, the Court expressly refused to address the issue of whether "the passage
of some length of time between citations would prevent basing a repeat citation on the
earlier occurrence" because the three violations in Todd occurred within a five-month
period. [d. at 687 n.8. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit could prevent needless litigation by
noting that resolution of these issues is within the final purview of the Commission. Such
an approach might add needed weight to Commission interpretations; it also might help
convince future litigants that United States Circuit Courts of Appeal should not be looked
to as the sole and final authority on the Act.
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with safety standards. so The Ninth Circuit's holding in the context of the overall structure and intent of the Act should be clear.
By interpreting "repeatedly" as "any recurrence" the Ninth Circuit has put employers on notice that more severe penalties will
be imposed unless hazardous working conditions are eliminated
after the first citation. When the dangerous condition is one creating a serious risk of harm to workers, it is particularly important that the employer immediately correct the violation and
prevent its recurrence. Congress has mandated that employers
must provide a safe place of employment for all workers. Todd,
as far as it goes, helps to further that goal.
Robert Haden

IV. SINGLE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN AFTER
WITHDRAWAL FROM MULTIEMPLOYER UNIT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,1 the Ninth Circuit considered the
effect of the timely withdrawal of two employers from a multiemployer bargaining unit on their duty to bargain with the union
which they had previously recognized upon joining the multiemployer unit. In the first of a number of factually similar labor
cases decided this term, the Court held that the withdrawing
employers had a duty to bargain within their respective singleemployer units based on the presumption of the union's continuing majority status.
B.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In 1959, a voluntary combination of restaurant and casino
employers formed the Reno Employers Council (the Council) and
engaged in multi-employer bargaining with the Hotel-Motel &
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders' Union (the Union). Upon
joining the Council, each employer voluntarily 'recognized the
Union as the bargaining representative of its employees. Representation elections were never held in either the single employer
80. [d. at 685.
1. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Anderson, J.;
the other panel members were Trask, J. and Grant, D.J.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2847
(1979).
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units or in the multi-employer unit. 2 The employers, Nevada
Lodge and Tahoe Nugget3 (the Employers), who had never bargained with the Union on an individual basis, joined the Council
in 1959 and 1962, respectively, and became parties to a series of
three-year contracts, the last of which was to expire in November,
1974. In September of that year, these Employers withdrew from
the Council in a timely manner and subsequently refused to recognize or to bargain with the Union.·
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) alleging a refusal to
bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act5 (the Act). The Union contended that the employers
had a duty to bargain within the newly created single employer
units based upon the Union's presumed continuing majority status. a The Board found that the presumption of continuing majority status arising from an employer's voluntary recognition of a
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees
continues after the employer withdraws from a multi-employer
unit.1 In addition, the Board found that the employers failed to
prove that their refusal to bargain was predicated on a reasonably
grounded good faith doubt as to the Union's continuing majority
status. s The Board ordered the employers to bargain with the
umon.
In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,8 the Board petitioned the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of its bargaining order.
Again, the Employers contended that the presumption of majority status was inapplicable after a timely withdrawal from a
multi-employer unit, and that, even if it were applicable, a reasonable doubt as to the union's majority status had been proved.
2. 584 F.2d at 296.
3. Tahoe Nugget and Nevada Lodge were consolidated on appeal. In addition to the
refusal to bargain violation, Nevada Lodge also involved an independent 8{a)(1) violation
which wi1l not be considered in this note. Nevada Lodge, 227 N.L.R.B. 368 (1976).
4. 584 F.2d at 296. For the basic principles relating to a timely withdrawal, see note
29 infra and accompanying text.
5. Section 8{a){5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that "(a) lilt shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of § 159{a) of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158{a){5) (1976).
6. 584 F.2d at 296.
7. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357 (1976).
8. [d. at 357-58.
9. 584 F.2d at 296.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Employers' arguments and
granted enforcement. 10 This note will focus on the Ninth Circuit's
application of the presumption of continuing majority status to
a single employer bargaining unit following an employer's timely
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit. In addition, it will analyze the "good faith doubt" defense as affected by the court's
extension of the Bryan Manufacturing ll rule precluding the use
of events occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the
unfair labor practice charge as evidence of an employer's good
faith doubt.
C.

THE PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUING MAJORITY STATUS

To sustain a refusal to bargain charge against an employer,
the Board's General Counsel must prove that the union involved
represented a majority of that employer's employees on the refusal to bargain date. 12 The majority status of an incumbent
union is generally proven by evidentiary presumptions, which are
sufficient, if unrebutted, to establish an employer's duty to bargain,, 3
The usual justification for use of presumptions is that such
a degree of probability exists that the fact presumed reflects reality that the presumption is an appropriate procedural substitute
for evidence." The basis for the presumption of an incumbent
union's continued majority status, however, is "primarily policy
.; it is a vehicle for maintaining industrial peace."15 The use
[d. at 308.
Local Lodge #1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Manufacturing), 362 U.S. 411 (1960). See
infra and accompanying text.
This requirement is mandated by § 9(a) of the Act which provides, in part, that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive bargaining
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur·
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976)(emphasis added).
13. Komatz Constr., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 458 F.2d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 1976); Terrell Mach.
Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 929 (1970); Bartenders, Hotel·Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n of
Pocatello, Idaho, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974).
14. NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1972); Ref·Chem Co. v.
NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 130·31 (5th Cir. 1969); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 807 (1972); 29
AM.JUR.20 Evidence § 165 (1967).
15. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 303. Section 1 of the Act sets forth the
preservation of industrial peace as a primary goal of labor legislation: "Experience has
10.
11.
note 60
12.
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of this presumption to achieve stability in established bargaining
relationships can be a source of conflict with another major goal
of the Act-that of ensuring employee freedom of choice in the
selection of a bargaining representative. 18 The tension in the Act
between these two goals is apparent from an analysis of the rights
guaranteed employees under section 7 of the Act.17 This section
guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. Implicit in this section is
the right to change representatives or, as spelled out by the Taft·
Hartley Amendments to section 7, "the right to refrain from"
being represented by any labor organization at all. 18 In spite of the
policy favoring freedom of choice, "[t]he presumption that a
bargaining relationship, lawfully established, lawfully continued
is embedded in the statute and precedent. Unrepresented and
represented employees are both presumed to desire continuation
of the existing status in the absence of proof to the contrary."19
This "common expectation of continuity"20 has been embodied in
proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest. . . ."
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
16. The preamble to the Act provides, in part, that:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organizatio~, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
17. Section 7 of the Act provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title:
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
18. Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL. L.
REV. 961 (1972-73).
19. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N.L.R.B. at 358 n.8.
20.Id.
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the rule that both Board-certified 21 and voluntarily recognized 22
unions enjoy an irebuttable presumption of majority status for
either one year after the Board certifies the union, or for a reasonable time, generally one year, after an employer voluntarily recognizes the union. In addition, after the expiration of the year, a
rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status is employed. 23
Although these presumptions are normally applied within
the context of union recognition, they have been applied outside
the original relationship. The most notable example of this is in
the "successorship" context where the Supreme Court has held
that successor employers who hire a majority of a predecessor's
employees must recognize and bargain with the incumbent
union. 24 In NLRB u. Tahoe Nugget, the Ninth Circuit extended
the application of the presumption of continuing majority status
to a new context when it held that the presumption survives an
employer's timely withdrawal from a multi-employer unit and
that, in this context, employee freedom of choice must "subserve
the goal of industrial peace."25
21. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835
(9th Cir. 1978); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975); Celanese
Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), reu'd on other grounds, Hawaii Meat Co., Ltd.,
139 N.L.R.B. 966, 968 (1962).
22. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
23. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Gallaro,
419 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1969); Bartenders, Hotel Motel Restaurant Employers Bargaining
Ass'n of Pocatello, Idaho, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480
(1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
24. NLRB v. Burns Int'1. Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). Burns "recognizes that
in at least some circumstances, the democratic principle embodied in § 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act is not offended by procedures which leave some doubt as to the
actual, immediate desires of employees with respect to representation." Zim's Foodliner,
Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
25. No prior cases were found which applied the presumption of continuing majority
status to an employer who timely withdrew from an employer association. However, cases
in a parallel context imply that the presumption was not employed after timely withdrawal of a union from multi-employer bargaining. Because a union has the same right
to withdraw from a multi-employer bargaining unit as does an employer, employers have
been required to bargain with unions on a single-employer basis following the union's
timely withdrawal from the multi-employer unit. Decisions and bargaining orders issued
in this context, however, have not been predicated on the presumption of the union's
continuing majority status within the single-employer unit. For example, in Adams Furnace Co., Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1966), the Board held that the union was entitled to
an election at each employer member's separate unit since the union had given the employer association and each member written and timely notice of its intent to abandon
multi-employer bargaining and to negotiate on an individual basis. In Publishers' Ass'n
of New York City v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966), the court enforced the Board's
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Background and Court's Analysis

Although multi-employer units are nowhere mentioned in
the Act, the Supreme Court has recognized that this type of bargaining mechanism is "a vital factor in the effectuation of the
national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened
collective bargaining."26 Unlike other bargaining units,27 the
multi-employer unit is consensual.
Essential to the establishment of such a unit is the
unequivocal manifestation by the employer members of the group that all of them intend to be
bound in future collective bargaining by group
rather than individual action. The formation of
the mUlti-employer unit, moreover, must be entirely voluntary, the assent of the union having
representative status also being required. The
Board will not sanction the creation of such a unit
over the objection of any party union or employer. 28

While an employer's decision to participate in multiemployer bargaining is essentially voluntary, withdrawal from
group bargaining is permitted only under certain conditions.
Once negotiations have begun, a member of a multi-employer
bargaining group cannot withdraw and avoid the results of group
bargaining without the consent of both the participating union
and the employer group. An untimely withdrawal attempt will
not relieve the employer from the obligation to abide by whatever
bargaining order and held that the union's withdrawal was timely and that individual
units were appropriate. In that case, however, it was conceded by the court that the union
had a majority of employees in each individual unit. Finally, in Evening News Association, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967), the Board found
that the employer had violated the Act by refusing to bargain individual1y with the union
which had effectively withdrawn from multi-employer bargaining. It held that there was
no basis for treating unions differently from employers:
[i)n either case [after the employer's or the union's timely
withdrawal) . . . , the union may be faced with the possibility
of having to demonstrate that it has been designated by a majority of the employees in the individual employer units resulting from the breakup of the multi-employer unit, if it is to
retain its status as the bargaining representative of such employees.
154 N.L.R.B. at 1499. For cases which have held that the presumption does not survive
an employer's withdrawal from a Board-certified multi-employer unit, see note 45 infra.
26. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union #449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957).
27. General1y, the determination of the appropriate unit for the purposes of col1ectively bargaining is the responsibility of the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
28. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 238-39 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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contract terms are ultimately negotiated. 29
Unions which participate in multi-employer bargaining may
be either certified or voluntarily recognized and the usual irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions of continuing majority status apply.30 In Tahoe Nugget, the court employed three additional presumptions in reaching its conclusion that the presumption of continuing majority status survives an employer's timely
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit and subjects the single
employer who is unable to rebut that presumption to a duty to
bargain.
The first presumption was that majority status existed
within the single employer unit prior to the employer's entry into
the multi-employer bargaining unit,31 since the Employers would
not have violated the law by recognizing a minority union. That
Employers would not recognize a minority union stems from the
major limitation on an employer's freedom to enter into a multiemployer unit: the consent requirement. An employer cannot unilaterally, without the express or implied consent of a majority of
its employees, bind them to representation in a multi-employer
unit. At the time an employer joins a multi-employer unit, the
relevant group of employees for determining a union's majority
status as bargaining representative is the employees of the single
employer unit. 32 A violation of this consent requirement would
subject employers to a charge of restraining or interfering with the
employees' section 7 rights. 33 Because the court presumed that
29. NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,385
U.S. 1005 (1967). The basic principles relating to withdrawal are as follows: (1) the notice
of withdrawal from the multi-employer unit must be sent to both the employer association
and to the union and must be received "before the date set by the contract for notice of
modification or termination or before the agreed-upon date to begin mUlti-employer negotiations, whichever occurs sooner. (2) The withdrawal must be unequivocal, and subsequent participation in the group negotiations or de facto compliance with the resulting
contract absent indepeneent negotiations may nullify an otherwise effective withdrawal.
(3) Withdrawal may be accomplished at any time, if both the employer group and the
union clearly consent." Kirshman, Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining, 46 L.A.
B. BULL. 220, 225 (1971).
30. See notes 18 to 23 supra and accompanying text.
31. 584 F.2d at 303.
32. C. MORRIS, supra note 28, at 240.
33. Two cases which hold that employers violate § 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) where they
bind their employees to representation in a multi-employer unit without the express or
implied consent of their employees are Dancker & Sellew, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 824 (1963),
alrd sub nom., NLRB v. Local 210, 330 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1964); Mohawk Business Mach.
Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248 (1956).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

59

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 13

418

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:359

the Employers would not have violated the law, they inferred that
a majority of the single unit employees expressly or impliedly
gave their consent to representation in the multi-employer unit. 34
The court's second presumption was that this initial majority
status within the single employer unit "subsisted" throughout
the employer's participation in the multi-employer unit. 3s Once
an employer has joined the multi-employer unit, the relevant
majority for determining representation status switches from the
employees in the single-employer unit to the aggregate employees
in the multi-employer unit. 38 At this point, loss of majority support within the single employer unit becomes irrelevant to the
union's status as the bargaining representative of the employees
within the multi-employer unit. Despite this fact, the court
stated that continuing membership in the larger unit "does nothing to negate" the presumption of majority status within the
single employer unit. 37
The third presumption relied upon was that this
"subsisting" presumption was revived upon the employers' withdrawal from the multi-employer unit. 38 Specifically, it was triggered when the employer who had timely withdrawn from the
larger unit refused to bargain with the incumbent union on a
single employer basis.
These three presumptions, coupled with the policy of maintaining stability in established bargaining relationships, led the
court to conclude that the presumption of continuing majority
status had survived the employers' timely withdrawal from the
multi-employer unit.

Direct-Derivative Analysis
In his dissent to the Board's Tahoe Nugget decision, Member
Walther argued that the presumption of continuing majority status should not be applied to a single-employer unit after withdrawal from a multi-employer unit because of the distinctions
34. 584 F.2d at 303.
35. [d.

36. C. MORRIS, supra note 28, at 240; Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503
(1964), enforced, 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966); Mor Paskesz, 171 N.L.R.B. 116 (1968),
enforced, 405 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1969).
37. 584 F.2d at 303.
3S. [d.
I
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between presumptions applicable to single-employer and to
multi-employer units. 3D Under his analysis, the critical factor,
ignored by the Board and subsequently by the Ninth Circuit, is
that the relevant majority for determining a union's status as the
exclusive bargaining representative in a multi-employer unit "is
the majority of employees within the entire multi-employer
unit."40 Consequently, a majority of the employees of a singleemployer unit need not be in favor of the bargaining representative of the multi-employer unit. In fact, once an employer joins a
multi-employer unit it does not violate the law by continuing to
bargain with a union which does not have majority status among
its own employees. As a result, "the presumption of continued
majority in a multi-employer situation provides no basis in fact
or in law for a presumption of majority in the single-employer
unit, since the former presumption exists regardless of, or even
contrary to, actual majority status on a single-employer basis."41
He concluded that since presumptions are "essentially legal fictions," they should not be employed where "they fail utterly to
mirror reality (as when the probability of the fact presumed to be
in existence diminishes to nothingness) . . . ."42
The Ninth Circuit responded to this analysis by stating that
the presumption of continued majority in a single-employer unit
after an employer withdraws from a multi-employer unit is not
based upon majority status within the multi-employer unit. On
the contrary, it is directly inferrable from the employer's previous
action in joining the multi-employer association. This conduct by
the employer created a presumption that majority status existed
within the single-employer unit at the time the employer joined
the multi-employer unit. Because membership in the larger unit
does nothing to erode this presumption, withdrawal merely entails a return to the status quo ante. 43 By asserting that the employer's own initial conduct is the basis for the "continued majority" presumption, the court precluded the employer from arguing
that majority status never existed within the single-employer unit
at the time the employer joined the association. This argument
was previously rejected by the Board, relying on the rule that one
may not defend against a refusal to bargain charge on the ground
39. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N .L.R.B. at 358·59.
40. [d. at 359.
41. [d.
42. [d.

43. 584 F.2d at 302-03.
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that the initial recognition was unlawful, when recognition occurred more than six months before the charges were filed. 44
In rejecting the Walther analysis, the Ninth Circuit distinguished several cases which have held that the continuing majority presumption does not survive the dissolution of a multiemployer unit. These cases were distinguished on the grounds
that they did not involve an employer's voluntary recognition but
rather were based upon Board-certified elections within the entire
multi-employer units. Because an election within a multi~mployer unit does not prove that the union ever had majority
support of the employees within any single-employer unit, the
employer had reasonable grounds to doubt the union's majority
status,4s
Although the primary reason for applying the presumption
following withdrawal from a multi-employer unit is the maintenance of stability in establishe<;l bargaining relationships, the
Ninth Circuit's holding does not consistently effectuate that policy. The practical result of the Court's analysis is that the presumption will apply when an employer withdraws from a multiemployer association which voluntarily recognized its bargaining
representative, but will not apply when an employer withdraws
from a mUlti-employer association which recognized its bargain44. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N.L.R.B. at 363-64.
45. Two Sixth Circuit opinions which applied the "derivative" analysis and thus
refused to extend the presumption, evolved out of the same factual circumstances. In
NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964) and NLRB v. Richard
W. Kaase Co., 346 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965), employers who had previously recognized the
Bakery and Confectionary Workers union (BCW) joined a multi-employer association
which voted to recognize the American Bakery and Confectionary Workers union (ABC).
After ABC's certification year had expired. the successor employer in Downtown refused
to bargain with ABC and voluntarily recognized HeW on the basis of authorization cards.
Although the court found Downtown to be a succe880r employer subject to the presumption of continuing majority status. it accepted the employer's argument that a reasonable
doubt was proved. The basis for the reasonable doubt W8B the fact that a Board election
for ABC within the multi-employer unit did not prove that this employer's employees
supported ABC. The court concluded that the dissolution of the multi-employer unit of
which the predecessor employer's employees composed a relatively small segment served
as a reasonable ground for the belief that the union had lost its majority status among
those employees.
In Kaase, the employer recognized BCW after termination of the existing agreement
with ABC. Again, the court refused to enforce the bargaining order. It distinguished the
general rule that there is a rebuttable presumption of majority status after a certification
year has expired by noting that "the ambiguity inherent in the multi-employer election
relied on vitiates its efficacy to prove a majority as to any single employer. Before continuance of the fact of majority can be presumed, the original existence of that fact must be
established." 346 F.2d at 31.
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ing representative after a Board-certified election within the
multi-employer unit.4ft

D.

REBUTIING THE PRESUMPTION OF MAJORITY SUPPORT

One year after union certification or recognition,47 an employer may rebut the presumption by showing either: (1) that the
Union, in fact, had no majority on the date of the refusal to
bargain or (2) that the employer had a good faith, reasonable
doubt about the union's continuing majority status.4S The first
defense is essentially a "straightforward factual question"4D and
was not considered by the court, which instead focused on the
good faith doubt defense.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tahoe Nugget, there
were no time limitations on the evidence employers could introduce to substantiate their good faith doubts of a union's majority
status. In Tahoe Nugget, however, the Ninth Circuit placed severe time limitations on the evidence which can be introduced in
defense of a refusal to bargain charge. The court held that section
lO(b) of the Act,50 which states that "no complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board," functions
as an evidentiary bar when employers attempt to substantiate
their good faith doubt by offering evidence of knowledge of prelO(b) unfair labor practices. 51 In effect, the court held that the
objective facts on which employers may base their good faith
doubt are only those which have occurted within the six months
immediately preceding the filing of a refusal to bargain charge. 52
46. Although this result seems likely· under the analysis employed by the court, the
Ninth Circuit may apply the presumption in the context of withdrawal from a Boardcertified multi-employer unit. The court stated that the inference of majority status in a
single-employer unit from a union's victory in a multi-employer election is "reasonable"
despite the fact that other courts have deemed the inference to be too attenuated. 584 F.2d
at 303.
47. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
48. NLRB v. Morse Shoe, Inc., 591 F.2d 542,546 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Vegas Vic,
Inc., 546 F.2d 828,829 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Retired Persons
Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
1482 (1965), enforcement denied on other grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966).
49. 584 F.2d at 298.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
51. 584 F.2d at 301. As used in this note, the term "pre-10(b) unfair labor practice"
means an alleged unfair labor practice which occurred more than six months prior to the
filing of the current unfair labor practice charges.
52. A previous Ninth Circuit case held that evidence of an unfair labor practice which
occurred beyond the 10(b) period could not be admitted in defense of a refusal to bargain
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In reaching this decision, the court distinguished issues requiring proof of subjective motivation from those of refusal to
bargain. According to the Ninth Circuit, section lO(b) is not an
evidentiary bar when a showing of subjective motivation is necessary to disprove an unfair labor practice charge. But that section
is an evidentiary bar in a refusal to bargain situation, however,
since "[s]ubjective motivation is not . . . an element of the
reasonable doubt defense." 53 The court stated that the Sixth Circuit had misperceived the good faith criterion when it held in
NLRB v. Dayton Motels 54 that section lO(b) does not act as an
evidentiary bar where employers attempt to prove their good
faith doubt of majority status. The Ninth Circuit stated that the
focus of the good faith criterion is empirical and objective. 55 Relying on the Supreme Court's de-emphasis on employer motivation
in NLRB v. Gissel Packing CO.,S6 the court held that employers
are free to act on the objective grounds before them, regardless
of their subjective motivation, and that because a refusal to bargain charge is unconcerned with subjective motivation, evidence
of a pre-10(b) unfair labor practice is inadmissible. 57
Bryan Manufacturing and the Good Faith Defense
The use of section lO(b) as an evidentiary bar originated in
the Supreme Court's decision in Local Lodge #1424 v. NLRB
(Bryan Manufacturing). 58 That case concerned the continued enforcement of a union security clause in ~ collective bargaining
agreement which was executed more than six months previously,
at a time when the union did not represent a majority of the
employees covered by the agreement. The agreement contained
both a recognition clause naming the union exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees and a union security clause
requiring employees to become and remain union members.58
Both sides agreed that section lO(b) barred charges relating specifically to the execution of the agreement. The Board contended
charge, but that case dealt only with the "no majority in fact" defense. NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1972). As a result, the court in Tahoe Nugget was
presented with an open question as to whether such evidence could be used to show that
the employer entertained a good faith doubt of the union's majority.
53. 584 F.2d at 301.
54. 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973).
55. 584 F.2d at 299.
56. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
57. 584 F .2d at 300-01.
58. 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
59. [d. at 412.
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that the complaint was timely since it was based upon the parties
continued enforcement, within the period of limitations, of the
union security clause. 8o Because enforcement of the clause was
tainted only by the now time-barred unlawful recognition clause,
the employers argued that to accept the position that section
lO(b) is only a statute of limitations and not a rule of evidence
would prevent the running of the statute of limitations in a case
of this kind. 81
The Supreme Court accepted the employer's view and held
the complaints barred by section 1O(b).82 Although section lO(b)
does not prevent all use of evidence of events which transpired
more than six months before the filing of a charge, due regard for
the policies and purposes of lO(b) requires that two situations be
distinguished:
The first is one where occurrences within this six
month limitations period in and of themselves
constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair labor
practices. There, earlier events are utilized to
shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period; and for that
purpose section 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such
evidentiary use of anterior events. The second situation is that where conduct occurring within the
limitations period can be charged to be an unfair
labor practice only through reliance on an earlier
unfair labor practice. There the use of the earlier
unfair labor practice is not merely "evidentiary,"
since it does not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice. Rather, it serves to
cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself
60. 1d. at 415. This continuing enforcement violated Board principle, evolved under
sections 7 and 8 of the Act, that it is an unfair labor practice for each party to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union security clause if the union did
not represent a majority of unit employees when the agreement was executed. Maintaining
the agreement in force was considered a continuing violation of the Act. The majority
status of the union at any subsequent date was immaterial because it was presumed that
subsequent acquisition of majority status was attributable to the earlier unlawful assistance derived from the original agreement. The same doctrine applied to an agreement
containing only a recognition clause. 1d. at 414·15.
61. 1d. at 415-16.
62. 1d. at 416. As a result of its holding, the enforcement, as distinguished from the
execution of such an agreement, constitutes an actionable unfair labor practice for only
six months following the making of the agreement. 1d. at 423.
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to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally
defunct unfair labor practice. 83

In analyzing whether the decision to bar the Employers'
evidence in Tahoe Nugget was a correct interpretation of Bryan
Manufacturing, the threshold question is whether the defense of
the refusal to bargain charge was "inescapably grounded on
events predating the limitations period."84 If it was so grounded,
the evidence would have been excluded under the express language of the Supreme Court; thus, the line drawn between subjective and non-subjective motivation-for determining when section lO(b) functions as an evidentiary bar-would have been unnecessary to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Although a showing of
lack of majority status on the date of the Union's initial recognition, for the limited purpose of revealing the Employers' subsequent good faith doubt, would undermine the validity of the presumptions employed, the defense was not "inescapably
grounded" on pre-lO(b) events. The majority support needed to
prove a refusal to bargain violation is that existing on the refusal
to bargain date. 65 Had the pre-10(b) evidence been admitted,
then, the Employers would have to show objective facts of reasonable doubt of majority status on the refusal to bargain date. ee
A further question is whether the line drawn in Tahoe Nugget comports with the two situations distinguished in Bryan
Manufacturing. The Bryan Court stated that reference to prelO(b) unfair labor practices was ordinarily permissible to "shed
light" on the character of matters occurring within the limitations periodY The Tahoe Nugget court, on the other hand, said
it is permissible to shed light only where motivation is at issue. 68
This analysis, however, precludes the use of evidence which the
Supreme Court would arguably have allowed. Even where an
63. [d. at 416·17 (footnote omitted).
64. The Court expressed no view on the problem raised by cases which have held §
10(b) a bar in circumstances where the evidence marshalled from within the six month
period is not substantial, and the merit of the allegation in the complaint is shown largely
by reliance on the earlier events, other than to say that a violation which is "inescapably
grounded on events predating the limitations period is directly at odds with the purposes
of the § lO(b) proviso." [d. at 421·22.
65. 584 F.2d at 297.
66. Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978).
67. 362 U.S. at 416. Presumably, "ordinarily" permissible refers to situations such
as the one the court specifically did not address, i.e., where a court refuses to "shed light"
by admitting substantial evidence of pre.10(b) events in a case where there is insubstan·
tial evidence within the 10(b) period.
68. 584 F.2d at 301.
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employer's motivation is not at issue, pre-lO(b) events can be a
valuable tool for revealing the "true character of matters occurring within the limitations period . . . . "69 One example would
be where employees file a valid decertification petition seven
months prior to a union's refusal to bargain charge against the
employer. Under Bryan Manufacturing, evidence of the employer's knowledge of the decertification petition would have
been permitted to show the employer's good faith doubt of the
union's continuing majority statldS. However, under Tahoe
Nugget, it would not be permitted.
Because of the confusion and conflicts resulting from the
court's rigid adherence to the two situations distinguished in
Bryan Manufacturing, one commentator has suggested that section lO(b) be used as an evidentiary bar only after a full consideration of whether its use would be consistent with lO(b),s underlying policies. 70 These policies are first, preventing stale claims by
barring litigation over past events "after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of the
events in question have become dim and confused", 71 and second,
preserving stability in existing bargaining relationships.72
The effectiveness of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tahoe
Nugget in implementing those policies is illustrated by an analysis of the case history of Dayton Motels, the Sixth Circuit case
criticized by the Court for misperceiving the good faith criterion.
In Dayton, the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
bargaining order and remanded the case to receive evidence on
the circumstances surrounding the procurement of union authorization cards three years earlier and to consider that evidence on
the issue of the employer's good faith defense. 73 The court concluded that the employer's defense was not dependent on the
time-barred unfair labor practice. The court held that pre-lO(b)
69. Local Lodge # 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg.), 362 U.S. at 416.
70. Note, The Labor Statute of Limitations: The Bryan Manufacturing Co. Case
Revisited, 55 B.U. L. REv. 598, 620 (1975).
71. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947) (Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947).
72. Local Lodge # 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg), 362 U.S. at 419. "[Tlhe legislative
history contains affirmative evidence that Congress was specifically advertent to the problem of agreements with minority unions, had previously been at pains to protect such
agreements from belated attack, and manifested an intention, in enacting § lO(b), not to
withdraw that protection." [d. at 426 .
. 73. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 1973).
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events are admissible as background evidence reflecting on the
mental attitude or good faith doubt of the company officials that
the union ever represented a majority of employees. It further
stated that "[i]n no way does this constitute an attack on the
validity of the expiring agreement or on the presumption created
thereby, which attack was barred by Section lO(b) of the Act."74
Following remand, the Board took additional testimony but did
not modify its original conclusion that the employer had refused
to bargain. 75
On application for enforcement, the Sixth Circuit held that
there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the
Board that, although the union's original majority status had
been tainted by the pro-union activities of a female supervisor,
that conduct did not enter into the employer's subsequent decision to withdraw recognition from the union and to refuse to
bargain. 78 The dissent argued that the union had received substantial assistance from a supervisor in its solicitation of membership, that it therefore never had a bona fide majority status and
that it "ought not to be representing the companyls employees."77
Considering the "stale claims" policies of section lO(b), the
reopening of the Dayton record for consideration of events of more
than three years ago was likely plagued by missing witnesses and
the confused recollections which Congress considered in enacting
section lO(b). Furthermore, as revealed by the Dayton dissent, a
consideration of evidence of an employer's subjective state of
mind has great potential for disrupting the industrial stability
that was to be secured by foreclosing attack on the majority status of a union six months after its initial recognition. 7s To open
that status to allow proof of an employer's "good faith" in refusing to bargain could result indirectly in that which the Act directly prohibits. Viewed against this background, the Ninth Circuit's Tahoe Nugget opinion effectuates the policies of section
lO(b) more fully than does the Sixth Circuit in Dayton.
74. [d. at 333.

75. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 525 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1975).
76. [d. at 477.
77. [d.

78. "The debates show that the issue of representation by minority unions was in the
forefront of legislative concern." Bryan Mfg., 362 U.S. at 426 n.16.
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PRACTICAL EFFECT

The line drawn in Tahoe Nugget for the use of section lO(b)
as an evidentiary bar is a reasonable one in cases in which proof
of motivation is necessary. It presents problems, however, for the
employer who refuses to bargain and then defends on the basis
of a good faith doubt in the union's continuing majority status.
The good faith doubt defense originally depended largely on the
employer's subjective motivation, so that the true majority status
of the union on the refusal to bargain date was irrelevant. 79 Subsequent cases place much greater emphasis on the need for objective facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of that status. so
The employer must show "by clear, cogent, and convincing"81
evidence that there is sufficient reliable evidence to case a serious
doubt on the union's majority status. Good faith is now shown by
the employer's knowledge, at the time of the refusal, of sufficient
objective facts to raise a reasonable doubt, but excluding knowledge of facts which occurred more than six months prior to the
filing of the charge. In addition, the refusal must have occurred
in a context otherwise free of employer unfair labor practices. 82
79. In Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), rev 'd. on other grounds,
139 NLRB 966, 968 (1962), the Board stated that whether an employer violates § 8(a)(5)
depends not on whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut the continuing majority
presumption or to demonstrate that the union in fact did not represent the majority of
employees, but rather depends upon whether the employer in good faith believed that the
union no longer represented the majority of the employees. Prerequisites to a finding of
good faith were that there must have been "some reasonable grounds" and the issue of
majority status must not have arisen in a context of illegal anti-union activities. 95
N.L.R.B. at 673. The dissent stated that although the Board asserted that a presumption
of continuing majority status existed, in using the subjective good faith standard, it
ignored the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption.
[d. at 675.
80. The shift from a subjective good faith doubt standard to greater reliance on
objective evidence of majority status has been attributed to the difficulty of proving an
employer's subjective state of mind. Seger, supra note 18, at 984. In Komatz Constr., Inc.
v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 1972), the court stated that "[iln view of the demise
in Gissel Packing of the subjective test of an employer's good faith doubt . . . , the proper
test for rebuttal of the presumption is whether there is objective evidence sufficient to
warrant a good faith doubt of the union's majority . . . . " See also NLRB v. Vegas Vic,
Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1978); NLRB v. Windham
Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1978); Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151
N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement denied on other grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir.
1966).
81. Pioneer Inn v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 839; Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB,
519 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. Good faith is only demonstrated where "employer misconduct did not contribute
to the loss of support." 584 F .2d at 300.
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In view of the high quantum of evidence needed to rebut the
presumption, the practical effect of the court's extension of the
Bryan Manufacturing rule is to severely limit the good faith defense. Where the facts relied upon by the employer are equivocal-Le., not clearly referable to a decline in union support-no
single factor will be sufficient to sustain the defense. 83 Although
the cumulative force of the evidence will be weighed against the
force of the presumption,84 the court did not consider the evidence
presented in Tahoe Nugget to have sufficient cumulative impact
to override the presumption. 85
Thus the Board and the court in deference to the Board,
place a high burden of proof88 on the party seeking to disrupt an
established bargaining relationship.
This, of course, is consistent with the philosophy
of American labor law of promoting industrial
peace through the collective bargaining process.
Moreover, the imposition of a high burden of proof
on the party seeking to overcome the presumption
of majority accorded to an incumbent union is a
recognition of the principle that a status shown to
exist is presumed to continue until shown to have
ceasedY

In view of the fact that majority status in Tahoe Nugget was
83. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 305.
84. Pioneer Inn v. NLRB, 578 F.2d at 840.
85. The following evidence was found to have insufficient cumulative impact to override the presumption: 1) reports of employee discontent which did not amount to a repudiation of the union, especially in the absence of a decertification petition; 2) high turnover, which is generally considered "insufficient to justify a refusal to bargain except when
caused by employee discontent with the union" as a result of the Board's "presumption
that new employees support the union in the same ratio as their predecessors ... "; 3)
union inactivity which is an objective ground on which the employer may rely but which
was found to be de minimis; 4) low union membership in the Tahoe area which was
considered to be only marginally relevant because it was never tied to respondent's employees and, in addition, employees may favor union representation but choose not to join,
especially in a right-to-work state; 5) financial difficulties of the union which the court
stated were irrelevant to the issue of union support; 6) prior amicable relations between
the parties; 7) admissions by the employer's attorney which related only to credibility and
were found to be insignificant here. 584 F.2d at 304-08.
86. The "clear, cogent and convincing" criteria is directed primarily at the type of
evidence relied upon; the standard of proof is unchanged, to wit: whether there is sufficient reliable evidence to cast serious doubt on union's mnjority." 584 F.2d at 297. The
court also said that placing the burden on the employer is fair because the employer
assumed the self-appointed role of vicarious champion of employee rights. [d. at 301.
87. Morales, Presumption of Union's Majority Status in NLRB Cases, 29 LAB.L. J.
309, 315 (1978).
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never shown to have existed, but rather was presumed to exist
from the beginning, the application of this principle in this context is questionable.

F.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Tahoe Nugget has been followed in a series
of cases arising out of the same factual context: the withdrawal
of individual employers from The Reno Employers Council followed by their refusal to bargain with the incumbent union. 88
The thrust of the Ninth Circuit's decision is to force employers
to continue to bargain with incumbent unions after they withdraw from multi-employer units and to place the responsibility
for asserting employee freedom of choice on the employees. Although the employers in Tahoe Nuggett argued that the application of the presumption of continuing majority status to a single
employer after withdrawal of a multi-employer unit is destructive
of the freedom of choice accorded employees in the selection of
their bargaining representatives, it is not employee freedom of
choice which is abridged by the court's decision. On the contrary,
what the court is regulating is the ability of emplo~rs to vicariously assert their employees' rights. The Supreme Court has recognized that allowing employers to rely on their employees rights
in refusing to bargain is inimical to achieving industrial peace. SD
When employers refuse to engage in collective bargaining in defense of their employees rights, the balance between industrial
stability and employee freedom of choice is weighed differently
than when employees themselves assert their rights and demand
decertification. DO
Employers are still free to petition the Board for an election
after they withdraw from a multi-employer unit. DI It is fairly
88. NLRB v. Carda Hotels, Inc., 604 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Sierra Dev.
Co., 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979); Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2837 (1979); Ponderosa Hotel and Casino, Inc., 233 N .L.R.B.
92 (1978); Nevada Club, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1977); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 275 (1977); Barney's Club, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 414 (1976).
89. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954).
90. Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975).
91. The Board has applied essentially the same criteria, however, to determine
whether there is a "question concerning representation affecting commerce" where an
employer files an election petition under section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Act as it does to determine whether the "objective considerations" claimed by the employer are sufficient to
support a good faith doubt defense in a refusal to bargain case. Morales, supra note 87,
at 310.
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clear, however, that absent unequivocal evidence ofloss of majority support, employers must continue to bargain until the Board
determines whether or not a question concerning representation
exists. Because the Board generally "stays" election petitions
pending resolution of unfair labor practice charges, once the
union files a refusal to bargain charge, the employer will be confronted with the presumption and the necessity of producing sufficient timely and objective facts to rebut that presumption.
Lyn Woollard

V. , COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE
DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Boeing Company v. National Labor Relations Board, I the
Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) order directing Boeing Company (the Employer) to abide by the terms of a contract that
granted recognition to a craft union of welders, Local 286- W,
International Union of Operating Engineers (the Union).2 The
NLRB found a breach of the contract and therefore, a violation
of section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA
or the Act).3 Since 8(d) violations routinely imply violations ofthe
1. 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. Sept. 1978) (per Kunzig, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Duniway and Wright, JJ.).
2. The Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970), which states in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith . . .
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining
contract . . . the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean
that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days
prior to the expiration date thereof, . . .
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract . . .
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
. . . and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to
strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing
contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or
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employer's duty to bargain in good faith, the Board deemed section 8(a)(5)4 of the Act violated also. The NLRB determined that
the recognition clause of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) placed the function "tack welding" within the
Union's jurisdiction and the Employer violated its duty to bargain in good faith when it transferred that function to- another
bargaining unit. The Board's order directed the Employer to
cease and desist 5 from this practice during the life of the agreement. a The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the order, holding
that since tack welding was not a term expressly contained in the
contract, the Employer was free to transfer the work out of the
Union's bargaining unit as long as it: 1) bargains in good faith to
impasse over the decision, and 2) has no improper motive in
taking its action. 7
This holding seems to merely reiterate well settled law that
decisions by employers in areas traditionally designated as management prerogative are subject to bargaining only insofar as they
impact on wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. 8 However, implicit in the court's reasoning is the requirement of an explicit itemization in the CBA of every function
normally alloted to a specific bargaining unit before work transfers can be found prohibited under section 8(d), no matter how
explicit the parties' bargaining history on the issue. This denigration of the NLRB's expertise in labor relations and the potential
destabilization of collective bargaining relationships may have a
widespread effect on labor relations in unclear areas of management prerogative and union representation of its membership.
until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later . . . .
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1970) which states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (5) to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees
Since both 8(d) and 8(a)(5) deal with the duty to bargain in good faith, an employer's
violation of one is generally a violation of the other. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVEL·
OPING LABOR LAW, Ch. 11 (1971, Cum. Supp. 1971·75, Supp. 1976, Supp. Hin).
5. The authority for Board cease and desist orders may be found in § 10(c) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
6. 230 N.L.R.B. at 705.
7. 581 F.2d at 797.
8. See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 15.
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FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED

In 1959, the NLRB carved out a craft unit of welders from a
larger bargaining unit then employed at Boeing and represented
by the International Association of Machinists (lAM), ruling that
the welders were more appropriately represented in a craft unit
and had a similarity of skills that were substantially different
from the other members of the bargaining unit. 9 Based on functional criteria, the Board twice modified the jurisdictional grant
to the Union through the procedure of petitioning to clarify the
unit. lo Certain functions were determined to be welding and assigned to the Union; others were not considered welding and were,
therefore, assigned to the larger unit represented by lAM. Each
modification was adopted pro forma as the new recognition clause
in the next CBA. II
In 1977, despite the previous bargaining history, the Em9. Boeing Airplane Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 689 (1959). In 1939, the Board determined that
craft units would not be carved out of broad industrial units (as here) unless the industrial
union failed to show that it adequately represented the crafts' interests and the past
bargaining history showed successful representation of the broad unit. American Can Co.,
13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939). In response, Congress added section 9(b)(2) to the then National
Labor Relations Act (now Labor Management Relations Act) stating:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof: Provided That the
Board shall not. . . (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has
been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against
separate representation . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2)(1970).
In 1954, just prior to the creation of this welders' unit the Board interpreted section
9(b)(2) to grant free severance to craft units. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 107
N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 9 (1971); J. ABODEELY, THE
NLRB AND THE ApPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 87-92 (1976) (Labor Relations and Public
Policy Series, Rep. No.3, U. Pa.).
10. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698 n.7. Clarification is provided for by § 10(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(d), where the Board is authorized to modify or set aside any finding or order not
made final. NLRB determinations of representation proceedings (29 U.S.C. § 159 et seq.)
are not considered final orders within § 160 of the Act. Under rule 102.60(b) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1017 (1969), "[a] petition for clarification of an
existing bargaining unit or petition for amendment of certification may be filed by a labor
organization or by an employer."
11. "[F]rom 'February 20, 1959, to date, the applicable recognition clause in the
[union's] (or its predecessor's) contracts with [the Company] were identical to the
bargaining unit's description as found in the most recent NLRB certification.''' 230
N .L.R.B. at 698.
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ployer decided that tack welding could be unilaterally reassigned
and no unit clarification procedure would be necessary. Since the
Union felt that tack welding was covered by the recognition
clause and within its exclusive jurisdiction, it filed an unfair labor
practice l2 charge with the NLRB charging unlawful erosion of its
bargaining unit. Hence, this disagreement over the Union's jurisdiction arose in the arena of an unfair labor practice hearing
rather than a unit clarification hearing. 13 In deciding whether or
not tack welding was protected by the agreement, the Board
adopted the reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
who determined that the bargaining history between the. parties
placed the tack welding function within the recognition clause of
the contract. By transferring the work from the unit without the
Union's consent, the Employer violated section 8(d) and derivatively sections 8(a)(1) and (5). 14 The ALJ determined that tack
welding was within the terms of the contract's recognition clause l5
by looking at the past bargaining history between the parties: the
parties had previously interpreted that recognition clause by de12. [d. at 696.

13. See note 10 supra. Since unit clarification proceedings are not final orders under
29 u.s.c. § 160, they are not generally reviewable by the courts except as incidental to
unfair labor practices contained in 29 u.s.c. § 158. Hence, one possible defense to the
Board's decision in Boeing was that tack welding is not an appropriate function of the craft
unit. The Boeing Court does not address this issue. See J. ABODEELY, supra note 9, at 11419.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1970) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this titlll." For the text of § 158(a)(5) see note 4 supra.
15. The recognition clause in the collective bargaining agreement describing the
"unit covered" in this bargaining unit between the union and the employer states:
All welders, including research, high strength, production,
burner, gas and arc, maintenance A and maintenance B welders, welder leadmen, burners' apprentices and helpers, and including all employees operating machine welding equipment
where, in the operation thereof and in the process of the weld,
based on the employees' sight or sound observations, the equipment may require adjustment in variables such as travel speed,
arc voltage, arc gap, current, amount of filler metal being fed
into welding puddle, seam tracking or adjustment for variations in the thickness of material, mismatch or gap, in order to
produce a satisfactory weld, employed by the Employer at its
plant and operations located in the state of Washington, excluding automatic fusion welding machine operators, sheet
metal worker and welder maintenance C employees, employees
operating the Airco gas tungsten arc welding machine at the
Employer's Auburn, Washington, plant, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, all other employees, and
supervisors are defined in the Act.
230 N.L.R.B. at 698 n.8.
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ferring to the NLRB's unit clarification procedure. Thus, he asserted that had the Board conducted unit clarification l6 involving
tack welding, it would have properly determined that the function was more appropriate to a craft unit of welders than in the
larger unit of machinists. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded:
Therefore, the nature of the unit, the history
of its evolution, and the parties' practice of assigning welding, including tack welding, pursuant
thereto support the contention that the contractural unit did implicitly embody tack welding as
one of the job functions to which employees represented by the Union were entitled. 17

Despite the Board's reliance on the ALJ's conclusions, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the Board, holding that the recognition
clause could not legally be extended to cover functions, reserving
that clause to a description of the people who were included in
the unit. IS Therefore, assigning tack welding exclusively to Union
members could not be read as a term of the contract. Since the
function was not explicitly protected by the collective bargaining
agreement, there was no violation of section 8(d). Since there was
a stipulation that the Employer had fulfilled all other bargaining
duties,19 there was no showing of bad faith bargaining by not
discussing the Employer's decision to transfer this work. Therefore, the 8(a)(1) and (5) violations, which were based on bad faith
bargaining, must also fail.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning raises two important issues
regarding the role of the NLRB in contract administration. First,
when the NLRB creates a unit based on functional criteria, can
16. Board Unit determination is generally based on the following rationale: .. [Tlhe
Board's primary concern is to group together only employees who have substantial mutual
interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment." 15 NLRB ANN. REp. 139
(1950). See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 217. The major criteria in determining a severance
of a smaller group is at group's community of interest. Kennecott Corp., 176 N .L.R.B. 96
(1969); Kalamazoo Paper Box COI;p., 136 N .L.R.B. 134 (1962). If that smaller group claims
to be a craft unit, then the community of interest focuses on the skill and function of the
persons in the unit. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 109 N·.L.R.B. 651 (1954); Note, Labor Law-Labor.
Management Relation Act-Section 9b(2)-Requirements for Severance of Craft Workers-Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 988, 944 (1966-67).
17. 230 N.L.R.B. at 700.
18. 581 F.2d at 797.
19. "As all parties agree that . . . [the Employerl satisfied any bargaining obligation owed the Union absent the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, the obvious
threshold question is whether it may be found that the current agreement embodies tack
welding in the contractual unit." 230 N .L.R.B. at 698.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13

76

Robinson et al.: Labor Law
LABOR
LAW

1980]

435

erosion of that unit be halted, and if so, how? Second, what is the
role of the NLRB in resolving the dispute? Regarding the first
issue, the Ninth Circuit is implicitly saying that the only way for
a bargaining unit to remain intact during the life of a CBA is for
the parties to write in explicit descriptions of every function that
the union represents. Regarding the second issue, the Ninth Circuit has asserted its predominent role in contract interpretation,
relegating the NLRB to the enforcement of clear and unambiguous terms and conditions and refusing to recognize Board expertise in the area of bargaining history interpretation.

C.

JURISDICTION OVER FUNCTIONS VERSUS RECOGNITION OF
PERSONS

In creating Boeing's craft unit of welders in 1959, the NLRB
relied on normal indices of craft units, based on functional criteria: the employees involved "perform skilled work, subject to
rigid inspection, and require a long period of on-the-job training
and experience," thus qualifying as a "true craft" group.20 Twice
the Board modified the craft unit here, once in 1966 on a petition
by the Employer and once in 1974 by request from the Union. 21
In determining whether certain classifications of employees
should be added, the Board used the test outlined in
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. 22 There the Board itemized six
factors for determining when it could appropriately create craft
units from larger units, including:
Whether or not the proposed unit consists of
a distinct and homogenous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the functions of
their craft on a non-repetitive basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct department.
1.

4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's
production processes, including the extent to
which the continued normal operation of the production processes is dependent upon the perform20. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 (1954).
21. See note 9 supra.
22. 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966). See also Holmberg, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 407 (1966); E. 1.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 413 (1966); C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at Ch. 9,
225-31; J. ABODEELY, supra note 9, at 94-106.
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ance of the assigned functions of the employees in
the proposed unit.23

139

Though the process of unit clarification differs from a determination of craft status in substantial procedural ways,24 the use of the
Mallinckrodt criteria is substantively appropriate since the substantive issues are identical. "Consequently, since 195~, the bargaining unit has remained a craft unit, the scope and composition
of which has been governed under Board principles concerning
such craft units. "25 Following each unit clarification the Employer and the Union have, apparently without discussion, conformed their recognition clause, to the Board's conception of the
craft unit which was based largely on functional criteria. 28
However, the Ninth Circuit, focusing on the lack of bargaining over the recognition clause, objected to the Board applying its
job function analysis to a clause which normally identifies the
people subject to the terms of the contract. Rather,' the court
urges that to properly protect the functions in a bargaining unit,
the parties must negotiate a "jurisdictional clause." Such clause
must, as far as possible, identify all of the possible functions that
areto be represented by the Union. "Rather than stretching the
meaning of a Recognitional Clause 'impliedly,' (implicitly' or 'in
effect' to cover 'functions' (as did the Board), a decision against
the Board would encourage the parties affirmatively to negotiate
an explicit 'Jurisdictional Clause' to be included in the next
CBA."27
23. 162 N.L.R.B. at 397 (emphasis added).
24. In a unit clarification, the procedure involved is much more abbreviated as the
relevant issues are proper classification of a particular job and/or accretions to bargaining
units. Rather than a full scale investigation into all community interests, bargaining
history and perhaps elections, the ALl makes a determination on a single fUnction. For a
discussion of the job classification issue, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 142 N .L.R.B. 317
(1963); Boston Gas Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 219 (1962). For a discussion of the accretion issue,
see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 NLRB 310 (1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173
N.L.R.B. 319 (1968). For a discussion of the determination of an appropriate unit, see
NLRB's Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-21 (1979).
25. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698.
26.1d.
27. 581 F.2d at 798. This "encouragement" was specifically addressed by the Board
and rejected as unworkable.
It is, of course, true that the recognition clauses in the
successive agreements in the instant case, as in University of
Chicago, have not recited in detail all of the skills, functions,
and duties which the employees encompassed thereby are to
exercise and perform. Indeed, it was principally this omission
which in that case led the Seventh Circuit to criticize the
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The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit decision, University of Chicago v. NLRB,28 for the proposition that an
explicit jurisdictional clause is desirable. However, the cases are
distinguishable: first, the bargaining unit in the University of
Chicago instance was not a craft unit, created on a functional
basis; and second, the work that was transferred from the bargaining unit in the University of Chicago instance was bargained
over extensively and the impacts were clearly minimized. 29 In
University of Chicago, a decision against the Board was likely to
encourage the parties to better protect their functional fiefdoms.
In Boeing, however, because of the lack of bargaining, the craft
unit founded on a functional basis, and the bargaining history of
the parties establishing an intent to determine their recognition
clause upon Board principles of craft units, the decision against
the Board is only likely to inhibit parties whose contractual protection is eroded from seeking Board protection.
D.

CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: THE

NLRB

OR THE COURTS

Section 8(d) of the LMRA, which defines the duty to bargain,
contains a proviso directed toward existing collective bargaining
agreements that cover the area complained of by the union or
Board's reasoning as a 'novel theory.' Yet, it is exceedingly rare
to find either a collective-bargaining agreement or a certification which does recite every detail of every duty of every classification encompassed therein. To attempt to do so would generate recognition clauses of tome proportions, particularly where
a number of classifications were encompassed or where the unit
covered, as in the instant case where 300 pages of transcript
plus a number of exhibits have been devoted to explaining
welding duties, craft employees.
230 N.L.R.B. at 700. Perhaps what the Ninth Circuit wishes to encourage is the adoption
of a catch-all phrase such as: "Jurisdiction: All functions presently performed by the
above recognized union members are reserved to those union members." Since this would
leave the Board in the same position as presented by the Boeing case, with the additional
catch-all requiring the ALJ to interpret the recognition clause by functional criteria, little
would seem accomplished by this phrase.
28. 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975) (enforcement denied, University of Chicago, 210
N.L.R.B. 190 (1974)).
29. 514 F.2d at 946. Additionally, in University of Chicago. the Board found, similar
to this case, the transfer of bargaining unit work functions to be specifically forbidden by
the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 2lO N .L.R.B. 190, enforcement
denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). This decision was based upon an analysis of the
bargaining history wherein the Board determined that the duties assigned to the bargaining unit were an "inextricable, albeit inexplicit, part of the bargaining history." 210
N .L.R.B. at 197. The Seventh Circuit viewed this past practice analysis of contractually
established work assignments, as a "novel theory" and, therefore, denied enforcement. 514
F.2d at 944.
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employer. 3o Neither party can alter or modify the terms of a contract during its terms except in certain instances or with the other
parties' consent. In both Boeing and University of Chicago, the
issue was framed as whether the employer can transfer work from
a bargaining unit covered by a CBA. The Board, in both instances
found that the work was an integral part of the recognition clause
and hence, a transfer of work without the other parties consent
was contrary to the 8(d) proviso. 3t In both instances, the circuits
reversed the Board, finding that the work was not .protected by
the recognition clauses:
As we read the cases, unless transfers are specifically prohibited by the bargaining agreement, an
employer is free to transfer work out of the bargaining unit if: (1) the employer complies with
... [the duty to bargain regarding transfers of
work] by bargaining in good faith to impasse and
(2) the employer is not motivated by anti-union
animus, . . . 32

The Ninth Circuit, by adopting the language of the Seventh
Circuit, clearly holds that the transfer of work from the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining, at least as far as
the decision to transfer affects those mandatory subjects of bargaining, wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.
However, also implicit in this reasoning is the prohibition that
the Board may not direct an employer to maintain such work in
the bargaining unit during the term of a CBA unless that agreement explicitly places the work in the bargaining unit. The effect
of this logic is to further limit the NLRB's role in contract administration.
30. See note 3 supra.
31. 230 N .L.R.B. at 701.
32. 581 F.2d at 797, quoting University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th
Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). The duty to bargain over the managerial decision stems
from the well·known case, Fiberboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), in
which a plurality of the Supreme Court held that when an employer subcontracts its
business or a part thereof, in certain instances the employer must agree to bargain over
the manner in which that decision affects wage, hours and working conditions of affected
employees. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. The anti·union animus portion of
the court's test derives from Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965),
where the Supreme Court held that an employer was free to close his business completely
and reopen it elsewhere. Such a decision is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and is
within a management's prerogative unless the decision is motivated solely by a desire to
avoid union organizing at the former site and the implementation of that decision is
subject to a request to bargain.
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The relevant history of section 8(d) shows that it is closely
tied with section 301 of the LMRN3 which allows private enforcement of arbitration clauses in contracts and which defers to the
contractually provided procedure for determining its scope. 3•
In 1971, the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire 35 determined
that when a contract contains grievance and/or arbitration machinery that may cover the issues raised under the LMRA, the
Board will defer to that machinery until it is exhausted or proven
futile. 38 The Board will then have the discretion to review the
settlement or decision. Section 301 of the LMRA allows private
enforcement of the arbitration clauses of collective bargaining
agreements, bypassing the Board's unfair practice proceedings.
Now, in light of Boeing and University of Chicago and the circuit
court's unwillingness to defer to Board expertise, the Board may
find its authority in contract administration further impaired.

E.

CONCLUSION

In Boeing, the Ninth Circuit held that as long as an employer
bargains to impasse and does not act with improper movitation
the decision to transfer work from a bargaining unit is not an
improper contract modification violating either section 8(d),
8(a)(1) or (8)(a)(5). Further, to stop employers from freely transferring bargaining unit work, a union must negotiate an explicit
jurisdictional clause, since explicit recognitional clauses, no matter what their bargaining history, are relegated to the protection
of bargaining unit members and not duties. Such a jurisdictional
clause must specifically establish that the disputed work assignment is a function reserved solely to the Union members. Further,
the court will not allow the NLRB to enforce terms and conditions
33. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970).
34. See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 17.
35. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
36. Id. at 843. Analagously, in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5 (Deering Supp. 1979), the
California Legislature expressly adopted the Collyer Insulated Wire doctrine and ordered
that the Public Employee Relation Board (PERB) shall not have authority to enforce CBA
agreements. Since PERB has found NLRB precedent persuasive guidance in interpreting
its function, see CSEA v. San Mateo County Community College Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No.
94 (jun. 8, 1979); Pajoraro Valley Unified Sch~l Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 51 (May 22,
1978); Sweetwater Union High School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No.8 (Nov. 23, 1976), the
impact of Boeing may be profound. Implying that it will only be an unfair labor practice
if an express term of the contract is violated, Boeing may exclude bargaining history and
other factors whenever the PERB is required to determine if a particular action by a public
employer that is claimed to violate a CBA is also an unfair practice under CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3543.5 (Deering Supp. 1979).
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contained in an agreement on the basis of an "implicit" provi.
sion, identified by the Board's interpretation of bargaining his·
tory. In other words, the Board may not use section 8(d) of the
LMRA to enforce impliedly established jurisdictional clauses to
contractually protect work assignments, even when that work
assignment or function is clearly at the root of the recognition
clause of the contract.
Kevin S. Robinson
VI. ILLEGAL ALIENS ARE EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION UNDER THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In NLRB u. Apollo Tire Co., Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit granted
enforcement to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) order correcting unfair labor practices 2 by the Apollo Tire
Company (the Employer). The Board's order directed the em·
ployer to cease and desist from threatening physical harm to
employees who exercise their rights under the Labor Mangement
Relations Act (LMRA, or the Act).3 It further ordered reinstate·
ment with back pay of those employees who were discharged or
laid off because of their exercise of these rights. In enforcing this
order, the court specifically affirmed the NLRB's refusal to hear
evidence that may have established that some of the employees
laid off or threatened were illegal aliens" The Board determined,
1. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were
Kennedy, J. and Hall, D.J.).
2. The Board found violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l) and 158(a)(4)(1976).
Section 8 of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 (29 U .S.C. § 157 of this
title) . . .
"
(4)
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
this Act;

ld.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
thrOugh representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . . "
4. 604 F.2d at 1181.
Illegal aliens are those aliens who would not be permitted to work in the United States
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in accordance with its longstanding rule, that aliens are employees5 as defined by section 2(3)8 of the LMRA; therefore, even if
the excluded evidence established the employees' unlawful status, it would be irrelevant to a determination of the issues involved. The Ninth Circuit agreed. 7
under pertinent federal laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE §
2805(a)(West 1971); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 n.13 (1976); DeCanas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 353 n.2 (1976); NLRB v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1182. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.,
583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978); Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 217 n.4
(1976).
5. The first mention of this longstanding rule appears in Logan & Paxton, 55
N.L.R.B. 310 (1944), in dicta:
While no direct issue was made at the hearings as to the inclusion in the units of non-citizen employees and their eligibility
to participate in the elections, it is evident from the record that
such an issue may arise at the time of the elections. The Act
does not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. In
order to effectively carry out the purposes of the Act, we conclude that no distinction should be drawn on such a basis (Cf.
Matter of U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1944) for the
analogous proposition that the Act does not distinguish between black and white employees). Non-citizenship of an employee shall not, consequently, constitute a disqualification for
participation in the election.
1d. at 315, n.12. From this first mention of the rule and analysis of the purposes of the
Act, the dicta became law. "[T]he Board has consistently held illegal aliens to be employees under the Act and entitled to its protection." Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No.
215 (July, 1978), 1978 NLRB Dec. ~ 19,571 n.l, citing Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976). See also Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. (1971); Seidmon, Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1953); Cities Servo Oil Co. of Penn., 87
N .L.R.B. 324, 331 (1949) ("The eligibility of aliens to cast ballots is too well established
to warrant justification anew here."); Azusa Citrus Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1946);
Allen & Sandilands Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 725, 730 (1944).
6. Section 2(3) of the LMRA reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the
Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home: or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by
an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, (citation omitted) as amended from time to time, or by any other person who
is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1974).
7. 604 F.2d at 1181.
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The employer raised two defenses to the Board's order: (1)
that the Board's longstanding rule conflicts with federal immigration laws, specifically the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA);8 and (2) by ordering the reinstatement of workers known
to be here illegally, the Board is forcing the employer to violate
state law, specifically section 2805(a) of the California Labor
Code.' The first argument was rejected by the court since grant"ing employee status under the LMRA does not conflict with the
INA and since the Board's interpretation of the LMRA best furthers the policies of the immigration laws. 1o The second argument
was rejected by the court on the grounds that the scope and
meaning of the state statute is unclear and may be constitutionally infirm as conflicting with the federal superintendence of
immigration and naturalization. Therefore, until the law is interpreted to be enforceable, the Board acted properly in treating
illegal aliens identically with other employees in awarding back
pay and reinstatement. II

B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Apollo Tire Co., Inc. is a business enterprise located in Canoga Park, California, employing approximately twenty-five employees, for many of whom English is not their first language,, 2 In early 1977, Mrs. Niz, whose husband and son were
Apollo employees, complained to the general manager of the
Employer about her son's unpaid overtime. Apollo's general manager told her husband that if she complained to the Department
of Labor about the wage dispute, the manager would have her
killed. Subsequently, the woman went to the Department of
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1952).
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1971) provides:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not
entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employ·
ment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.
(b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200)
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action
against the employer based upon violation of subdivision (a).
10. 604 F.2d at 1183. This holding reflects the rationale of N.L.R.B. v. Sure·Tan,
Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978) ...... [T)his certification and bargaining order are
not inconsistent with federal immigration laws . . . . Thus by refusing to certify unions
with a majority of alien members we would be giving employers an extra incentive to hire
aliens and thus would be defeating the goals of the immigration laws." [d. at 359, 360.
11. 604 F.2d at 1184.
12. The court fully describes the facts. 604 F.2d at 1181·82.
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Labor and obtained several complaint forms that she passed out
to other employees. Seven employees filed complaints with the
Department of Labor and six of the seven were laid off; four
were not rehired. 13 Despite the employer's protestations of economic necessity for layoffs, the trial examiner discounted this
reason because of inconsistent testimony by the employer's witnesses, the testimony of the Department of Labor compliance
officer who stated that the general manager knew the identity of
six of the seven complaining employees, and the testimony of all
six employees that the general manager told them that they
would not be rehired because of their complaints. If
C.

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS

In upholding the NLRB's longstanding rule that aliens are
employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the LMRA, 15 the
Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether or not the
Board should enforce LMRA policies that conflict with policies
of other adminstrative agencies. Rather than find the Board's rule
regarding aliens in conflict with federal immigration laws, the
Apollo court stressed the underlying policy: "Were we to hold the
[LMRA] inapplicable to illegal aliens, employers would be encouraged to hire such persons in hopes of circumventing the labor
13. Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (July, 1978) (advance sheet statement of
facts).
14. [d.

15. See note 3 supra for the history of this rule. The Ninth Circuit defers to the
NLRB's interpretation partially because in statutory construction great deference is given
to the interpretation by the agency charged with its administration, Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965), and because that interpretation is so well established. "Because
the Board's interpretation and application of the statute is well established, and has not
been disturbed by Congress, we defer to its understanding of the statute unless it is clearly
in error." N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1183 (citations omitted).
However, Judge Wood's dissent to N.L.R.B. v. Sure-Tan, Inc., stated: "I am not
persuaded in this instance by the argument that since the Board's interpretation is one
of long standing it is therefore entitled to great weight . I view it as only a case of the Board
having been wrong for a long time." 583 F.2d at 362. See Comment, Labor LawIllegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) And May Vote in Union
Certification Elections, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 747 (1979), which also criticizes this rule on
two bases: First, that the origin of the rule is dicta, and second, that the court never
explains how this policy of allowing illegal aliens to vote will effectuate the purposes of
the Act. [d. at 748 n.9, 751 n.34. However, the purposes of the Act are clearly set forth by
the broad definition of 2(3) of the Act. By listing exceptions to 2(3), Congress intended to
grant protection to all workers except a distinct few classifications. Illegal aliens are not
within those classes. When the Board does not apply this rule of interpretation to § 2(3),
it subverts the policies of the Act. See N.L.R.B. v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d at
1183; Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254 (1976) (Member Fanning,
dissenting) .
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laws."18 By adopting the reasoning of the only other circuit to
have dealt with the alien/employee l7 issue, the question of accomodation to other forums was sidestepped: s "We agree with the
Sure- Tan majority that the Board's interpretation best furthers
the policies underlying the immigation laws."19
However, in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc. the majority reserved
comment on the possibility of back pay and reinstatement orders
by the Board, expressing no opinion· as to whether or not such
orders would conflict with the INA.20 The only issue before the
Sure-Tan court was the validity of allowing aliens to vote in
NLRB representation elections. 21 The Ninth Circuit in Apollo
implicitly approves the Board's extension of the Sure- Tan reasoning to back pay and reinstatement orders.22
D.

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND CALIFORNIA LAW

California Labor Code section 2805 prohibits knowing employment of illegal aliens if such employment would adversely
effect lawful resident workers and provides for fines against employers who violate its provisions. 23
16. 604 F.2d at 1183.
17. N.L.R.B. v. Sure·Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. The Sure- Tan majority specifically declined to adopt the position, hotly disputed
in cases questioning the certification of racially discriminatory unions, "that the Board
should not enforce policies administered by other government agencies." [d. at 359 (citations omitted). The court found it unnecessary to adopt this policy because the Board
ordered no affirmative action on the part of the employer except to bargain with a duly
certified union. It expressly left open the question of whether back pay orders would be
appropriate for illegal aliens. In Sure Tan, Inc. (Sure-Tan 1I), 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978),
the Board found that the illegal alien voters in Sure-Tan had been constructively discharged by the employer when he or she reported their illegal status to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. [d. at 1187. The Administrative Law Judge declined to order
back pay and modified the normal back pay order because he found that the deported
workers were unable to work. The Board rejected this part of the order and directed that
a standard back pay and reinstatement order follow. [d. at 1188. The Board modified the
trial examiner's proposed order in a similar fashion in Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976) and Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (July, 1978), aff'd,
604 F.2d 11BO.
19. [d. at 1183.
20. 583 F.2d at 360 n.9. See also note 18 supra.
21. In Sure- Tan, the employer refused to bargain with the union and the Board found
a violation of the Act. The employer argued to the Seventh Circuit that six of the seven
voters in the union's certification election were illegal aliens, therefore, the union had no
majority status. The employer also reported his workers to the Immigration Service and
five were deported (discussed in Sure-Tan 1I). See note 18 supra.
22. 604 F.2d 1180 at 1183.
23. For text of CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805, see note 9 supra.
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In De Canas v. Bica,24 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a California appellate court ruling that Labor Code section
2805(a) unconstitutionally legislates in an area pre-empted by
federal regulation. 25 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, indicated that states are not necessarily barred from regulating
employment of illegal aliens. 28 The Apollo panel noted that the
Supreme Court did not suggest that California was free to legislate in the area of immigration, rather it held that Congress had
not expressly pre-empted the area. Thus, the California act is not
per se unconstitutional.27
Implicit in this analysis by the Supreme Court is the rule
that the California legislature cannot act in conflict with the
federal immigration policies and regulations. By applying the
Seventh Circuit's Sure- Tan analysis to the back pay reinstatement order, the Ninth Circuit, could by analogy have held that
back pay with reinstatement also best furthers the underlying
policies of Labor Code section 2805(a) .28 However, Apollo does not
explicitly reach that conclusion; rather, it merely holds that as
long as California law is unsettled and un interpreted in certain
crucial sections, the Board acts properly when it treats aliens in
24. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
25. 1d. at 354.
26. Power Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably ex·
clusively a federal power. . . . But the Court has never held
that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens
is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre·empted by
this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised . . . . In
this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy by
adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions
against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have
no federal right to employment within the country; ... [t]hus
absent congressional action, § 2805 would not be an invalid
state incursion on federal power. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
1d. at 354·56.
27. "[Tlhere are questions of construction of Section 2805(a) to be settled before a
determination is appropriate whether, as construed, Section 2805(a) can be enforced with·
out impairing federal superintendence of the field covered by the INA." N.L.R.B. v.
Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1184, quoting De Canas v. Bica, 4'24 U.S. 361, 363.
28. See note 26 supra. Justice Brennan notes that California is codifying federal
policies and regulations by adopting them in an attrJmpt to "strengthen its economy."
Since the impact of § 2805 in immigration is speculati.'e and indirect, it is not an unconsti·
tutional infringement on congressional power. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 at 365. The
Ninth Circuit, here, has stated that the Board's reasoning "best furthers the policies
underlying the immigration laws." N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1183. It is arguable
that Board policy would also not conflict with an interpretation of § 2806 which was
constitutional.
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the same manner as other employees so defined by section 2(3)
of the LMRA.29 Additionally, both circuits expressly allow the
employer the right to seek modification of the Board's orders
should it become apparent in the future that the order conflicts
with the policies of the various immigration acts. 30

E.

CONCLUSION

The LMRA boardly defines who is an employee by listing
certain exceptions to that definition.3t The NLRB has consistently determined that since illegal aliens are not listed among
those exceptions, they are fully protected under the provisions of
the LMRA.3z The Ninth Circuit in Apollo joins the Seventh Circuit in affirming the Board's analysis. The Ninth Circuit now
extends that analysis beyond representation proceedings to full
remedial rights afforded employees by the Act, including reinstatement with back pay to remedy unfair labor practices. Neither the Seventh nor the Ninth Circuits have reached the question of whether the Board should conform its rules and practices
to accomodate the underlying policies of other acts administered
by other administrative agencies. It is not surprising that the
circuits and the Board are in such agreement; but it is surprising
that this rule has taken so long to be recognized.
The rationale of this case is best expressed by Judge Kennedy's concurrence: "If the [LMRA] were inapplicable to workers who are illegal aliens, we would leave helpless the very persons
who most need protection from exploitative e'mployer practices
such as occurred in this case."33 Hopefully, when Apollo's holding
becomes widely known, these most exploited employees will find
it possible to assert their rights without fear of losing their jobs
or their lives.

Kevin S. Robinson
29. 604 F.2d at 1183.
30. Id, at 1184, citing N.L.R.B. v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d at 359.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. See notes 3 and 15 and., accompanying text.
33. N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1184. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also
Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 251 (1972). Because of a fear of
deportation and other reprisals, it is lesB likely that illegal aliens will be able to invoke
the mechanisms of the Act to stop such exploitative employer practices. Mike Yuvosek &
Sons, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 148 (1976); Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public
Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977).
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OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW

In NLRB v. Machinist Local 1327, International Association
of Machinists, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit
held that union provisions imposing a continuing obligation on
former members to honor a primary picket line is a valid restriction on members' rjghts to resign and fines may lawfully be imposed for violation of this obligation.
This case stemmed from the union's imposition of fines on
its members who resigned during a strike and returned to work
in violation of the union's constitution. The Ninth Circuit denied
enforcement to the Board which found that the union had violated NLRA section 8(b)(1)(A),' 29 U.S.C. section 158(b)(1)(A).
The constitution's provision stated that the acceptance of employment during a strike or lockout constituted improper conduct
by a member. It further provided that resignation would not relieve that member of the obligation to refrain from accepting
employment for the. duration of the strike or lockout. Members
were twice informed that the might be fined for violating the
provision.
The Board, in a three to two decision, held that the provision
did not justify the fine and, as a result, the union violated section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act which provides that it is unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their organizational rights, including
the right of a member to resign from the union. After an effective
resignation, the union has no more control over the former member than it does over any other non-member. The Board thus
found that the provision sought to unlawfully regulate the postresignation conduct of former members.
A proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), however, states that the section shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retnetion of union
membership. It was this exception to section 8(b)(1)(A) that the
1. "These sections in brief provide that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights of
self organization and collective bargaining, or to discriminate against employees on the
basis of union membership; or to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee." 583 F.2d 1095, 1095 n.1.
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Ninth Circuit majority focused on in refusing to enforce the Board
order. Drawing on the opinion of the Board's dissenting members,
the Court found that the union's provision was a contractual
restriction on the member's right to resign and not an unlawful
regulation of post-resignation conduct.
Because the Supreme Court, in Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 412-U.S. 84 (1973), expressly declined to consider the allowable extent to which a union may restrict a member's right to resign, the Ninth Circuit considered
the validity of the union constitution's provision. Although the
provision permitted resignation by a member, it limited the effect of a resignation occurring during or immediately preceding a
strike to protect the union against strikebreaking. Because the
ability to discipline strikebreakers is essential to a union's effectiveness as bargaining agent, resignation does not relieve
the resigner from the existing duty to refrain from strikebreaking.
The court found the union's provision enforceal?le as a reasonable regulation falling within the scope of the 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. Over a vigorous dissent, the majority relied on the fact that
the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A) makes no distinction between acts done
while a member and those acts done while not a member. Under
the dissent's view, however, once membership is resigned, an
employee again becomes fully protected by section 7 and any
imposition of fines for working during a strike would violate section 8(b)(1)(A).

In Lewis v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), the court
held that the Board need not defer to an arbitration award which
is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act; and employees do not violate the principle of exclusive representation
when they file unfair labor practice charges to force an employer
to fulfill its statutory duty to bargain.
Employees who were discharged as a result of the unilateral
introduction of a production quota system filed unfair labor
practice charges alleging that the company violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. These
violations occurred because the employer imposed the quota system without first bargaining with the Union. Additionally, the
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13
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employer forbade union representation at counseling and disciplinary sessions, another unilateral change. The Ninth Circuit
held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
defer to the arbitration process where the arbitrators ignored
well-established principles relating to the duty to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment. Production
quota systems and disciplinary sanctions come within
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The court concluded that the
union's access to the grievance procedure to challenge the quota
system did not constitute adequate bargaining. Bargaining between the company and the union must precede the decision to
take action relating to ,a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Where, as here, there was no bargaining involved, the employees
did not interfere with the union's bargaining position nor seek to
bargain directly with the company in violation of the union's exclusive representation rights. The employers sought only to require the company to fulfill its statutory duty to bargain. Under
these circumstances, NLRA section 9(a) does not forbid employees from filing unfair labor practice charges.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that the company's denial of union representation at employee "counseling"
sessions constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1). However, it
denied enforcement of the Board's order that the company allow
union representation in a disciplinary session where an employee
is merely informed of action to be taken. The right of representation arises when a significant purpose of the interview is to obtain facts from the employee to support disciplinary action
which is being seriously considered. Where an employee is not
subject to an interrogation but i,s merely investigated or informed of a disciplinary action, there is no right to union
representation.
Finally, the court upheld the Board's reinstatement order
since the loss of employment stemmed directly from an unlawful
refusal to bargain.

In Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d
857 (9th Cir. Mar. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that a trial
court has authority to stay adjudication of Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) claims pending arbitration of related contract
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claims where to do so would be efficient for its docket and where
the arbitration is proceeding efficiently.
Based upon an employer's failure to pay time-and-a-half for
work over forty hours per week, employees filed suit involving
both a violation of the FLSA and a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The Ninth Circuit held that the district
court correctly stayed the action pending arbitration provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the
contract claim was arbitrable, but the FLSA claim was not, since
the contract expressly limited recovery to six months while the
statute allowed recovery for two years of prior violations.
The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court for a determination of whether a stay of the FLSA claim would promote
a just and efficient determination of the case, considering both
the need to conserve judicial resources and the need for an expeditious resolution of the FLSA claims. In determining that the
employer/appellee had no right to a stay under the federal Arbitration Act, the court distinguished a prior case, Beckley v.
Teyssier, 332 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964), which held FLSA claims
arbitrable because they grow out of the employer-employee relationship and, therefore, necessarily involve application and interpretation of contract provisions. Unlike Beckley, the court felt
that the substantial differences in coverage between the contract
arbitration provisions in Leyva and the FLSA revealed that the
parties did not intend to substitute arbitration procedures for
the enforcement of statutory rights. Second, the court looked to
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the distinction between statutory and contractual rights in Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228 (1972).
Thus, despite the general rule that arbitration clauses
should be broadly construed, the court of appeal held that contracts which provide for arbitration of contract disputes should
not be read to require arbitration of statutory claims absent express provision for such arbitration.
The court concluded that the district court might order a
stay of such claims pending arbitration of the contract claims
under its power to control its own docket and to provide for the
prompt and efficient determination of its cases. The court declined to address the issue of whether it would be bound by the
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arbitrator's conclusions. Additionally, the district court should
consider conditioning any stay on satisfactory assurances that
the arbitration is proceeding with diligence and efficiency.

In NLRB v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural Reinforcing And Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 75, 583 F.2d 1094
(9th Cir. Oct. 1978), possible discriminatory motive was held irrelevant where action taken by the union was a non-discretionary contractual duty and where prior breach of that duty was
necessary to meet temporary, exigent circumstances.

This action arose out of a discrepancy in placement referral
procedures allowed under local and international union contracts. An iron worker charged the local union with a violation of
sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A) and 158(b)(2), for its refusal to refer him to a job
for which he had been requested by name. Under the international contract, employers could select ironworkers of their
choosing, regardless of the worker's place on the local hiring
hall's out-of-work list. Under the local contract, however, employers were required to hire workers from the top of the out-ofwork lists, except for "Group A" workers who had been within
the local jurisdiction for four years or longer. Appellee ironworker
was a "Group B" worker who had been requested by name by a
subcontractor subject to a local union contract, bound by the
top-of-the-list referral policy. The union refused to refer appellee
to the job, pursuant to the local contract.
The National Labor Relations Board found this refusal to be
a violation of the Act, despite the contractual provisions because
of possible animus by the union. It held that even though the
union was not contractually required to refer appellee to the job,
if the union used the contract as a pretext I10t to refer him, then
it violated the Act.
The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order.
Refusal to refer an employee on mere "arbitrary" or "irrelevant"
grounds or because of animus toward an employee violates sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) only where the action of the union is
discretionary. A discretionary action becomes an improper exercise of discretion if based on an improper motive. Where a union
is bound by a contract, no exercise of discretion is involved. Fur-
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thermore, the contract provisions relating to "Group A" and
"Group B" workers were not rights belonging to the local union
which it could waive. On the contrary, they are non-waivable
representative rights of the union's members. A "waiver" of
these rights would constitute a violation of the union's duty to
its members. Additionally, the union's allowing the employer to
retain a crew for one month without use of the out-of-work list
involved an emergency situation and such violations could not
be the basis for requiring an additional breach.
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